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DISCHARGED AND DISCARDED: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF A LESS-THAN-HONORABLE 
MILITARY DISCHARGE 
Hugh McClean* 
Between 2011 and 2015, 57,141 soldiers, sailors, and airmen were 
separated from service with less-than-honorable (LTH) discharges for mi-
nor misconduct related to mental health problems. These discharges dis-
proportionately affected servicemembers of color. These veterans and 
others like them face daunting reintegration challenges when they return 
to civilian society, as federal agencies and state governments deny them 
the benefits that usually facilitate a veteran’s smooth transition to civilian 
society. This Essay adds to the scholarly discourse on military discharges 
by comparing these veterans’ plight to that of persons arrested or 
convicted of criminal offenses, who also suffer from collateral 
consequences related to their criminal records long after their involvement 
with the criminal legal system. Military review boards, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) agencies charged with reviewing and correcting 
veterans’ discharges after service, were never intended to address the 
collateral consequences of military discharges, and the laws governing 
discharge review do not provide the boards with the authority to do so; 
however, DOD may finally be poised to institute reforms. This Essay 
responds to DOD’s recent call for the military service branches to consider 
the collateral consequences of military discharges in reviewing veterans’ 
petitions for discharge upgrades. This Essay examines why current laws 
and regulations are inadequate to implement DOD’s call and asserts that 
reform efforts aimed at addressing the collateral consequences of arrests 
and convictions in the criminal legal system must be replicated in the 
military. This Essay concludes that, without reform, a permanent class 
of dishonored veterans will never successfully reintegrate into society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Gonzalez served in the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2014 as a motor 
transport operator, or truck driver.1 During his first deployment to Iraq, 
                                                                                                                                
 1. See Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez to the Convening Gen. of the U.S. Army 
Recruiting Command 1 (Mar. 5, 2013) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The author 
supervised students representing Mr. Gonzalez (an actual client whose name has been 
changed to protect confidentiality) while serving as the Director of the Bob Parsons 
Veterans Advocacy Clinic at the University of Baltimore School of Law. Prior to founding 
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Mr. Gonzalez led multiple convoys that were struck by improvised explo-
sive devices (IED), mortars, and small arms fire.2 After witnessing the 
deaths and injuries of fellow soldiers in these attacks, he returned from 
Iraq and began experiencing symptoms of depression, anxiety, and sleep 
disturbances, and he sought counseling from the Army.3 He was diagnosed 
with major depressive disorder and referred to a psychotherapy program.4 
His symptoms worsened, and he was subsequently diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) and was 
prescribed antidepressants.5 Despite knowing that Mr. Gonzalez suffered 
from depression and alcohol dependence related to his PTSD and TBI, 
the Army deployed Mr. Gonzalez twice more during his career, exposing 
him to additional IED blasts and trauma.6 
The incident that led to Mr. Gonzalez’s discharge occurred three 
years after his last deployment. He was arrested on post for driving while 
intoxicated with his son in the vehicle and was charged under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).7 Mr. Gonzalez accepted an “Article 15,” 
an administrative forum for addressing violations of the UCMJ, and was 
found guilty by his unit commander.8 The Army subsequently discharged 
him for the misconduct and issued an other-than-honorable (OTH) dis-
charge, despite his severe history of PTSD and TBI and his successful com-
pletion of three deployments.9 The criminalization of Mr. Gonzalez’s 
mental health condition effectively terminated his chances of receiving 
medical treatment in service for his PTSD or TBI and reduced his chances 
                                                                                                                                
the clinic, the author served as an officer in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s 
Corps for more than ten years, where he litigated military discharge cases both for and 
against the Air Force. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Memorandum from an Attending Psychiatrist, Trauma Recovery Program, Walter 
Reed Nat’l Mil. Med. Ctr., to the Record 1 (Feb. 24, 2014) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
 5. See Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 1. Mr. Gonzalez began ex-
periencing increased nightmares, startle response, and irritability. Memorandum from an 
Attending Psychiatrist, supra note 4, at 2. 
 6. Memorandum from Mr. Gonzalez, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. See id. The UCMJ is a federal law that codifies military criminal offenses. 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–946 (2018). Mr. Gonzalez was charged with various UCMJ offenses, including (1) 
driving while under the influence of alcohol; (2) driving while under the influence of alco-
hol while transporting a minor; (3) failure to transport a child under age sixteen in a seat 
belt; and (4) operating a motor vehicle with the operator not restrained by a seat belt. See 
id. § 913. 
 8. 10 U.S.C. § 815. Article 15 of the UCMJ authorizes commanders to hear evidence, 
make findings of guilt, and punish servicemembers without a trial by court-martial. Service-
members have the right to decline Article 15 adjudication and demand trial by court-
martial. 
 9. Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, U.S. Dep’t of the Army (Aug. 
2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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of obtaining Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) healthcare after ser-
vice.10 More importantly, it discounted his medical condition and charac-
terized his service such that it would create lasting barriers to employment, 
education, housing, healthcare, and other critical aspects of civilian life. 
Unfortunately, Mr. Gonzalez’s case is not unique. In 2017, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that 62% of service-
members discharged from service for misconduct between 2011 and 2015 
had been diagnosed with PTSD, TBI, or some other mental health disor-
der within the two years preceding their discharges.11 Of those who were 
discharged, 23% received an OTH discharge and 70% received a “general” 
discharge.12 The GAO concluded that servicemembers with mental health 
issues were being disproportionately discharged with OTH or general dis-
charges, collectively referred to as “less-than-honorable (LTH) dis-
charges,” without due consideration of their mental health statuses.13 
Statistically, Mr. Gonzalez’s skin color also likely played a role in his 
discharge. In June 2020, the House Armed Services Committee Military 
Personnel Subcommittee held a hearing where a GAO official testified that 
servicemembers of color were twice as likely to face courts-martial as white 
servicemembers and were more likely to face nonjudicial punishment.14 In 
response to these statistics, top officials in the Air Force and Army testified 
that determining the causes of the racial disparities would require further 
                                                                                                                                
 10. Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs. to Mr. Gonzalez (Mar. 7, 2015) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6) (2020) (“However, if a person was 
discharged or released by reason of the sentence of a general court-martial, only a finding of 
insanity . . . or a decision of a board of correction of records established under 10 U.S.C. 1552 
can establish basic eligibility to receive Department of Veterans Affairs benefits.”). 
 11. Randall B. Williamson, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-260, DOD Health: 
Actions Needed to Ensure Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury Are 
Considered in Misconduct Separations 12 (2017) [hereinafter GAO Discharge Report]. Ac-
cording to the report, the military separated the servicemembers for minor misconduct in-
cluding drug use, absenteeism, and insubordination. Id. at 6. 
 12. Id. at 14. A general discharge signifies separation with a lesser degree of honor 
than an honorable discharge. The discharge is given when “faithful service is marred by 
negative aspects of a person’s duty performance or personal conduct, but the negative as-
pects definitely outweigh the good.” U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Instr. 36-3208, 
Administrative Separation of Airmen, para. A3.3. (2019) [hereinafter AFI 36-3208]. 
 13. See GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11, at 31. 
 14. Racial Disparity in the Military Justice System—How to Fix the Culture: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Mil. Pers. of the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 116th Cong. (2020), 
(statement of Brenda Farrell, Dir., Def. Capabilities and Mgmt. Team, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Off.); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-20-648T, Testimony Before the 
Subcomm. on Mil. Pers., Comm. on Armed Servs., H.R., Military Justice: DOD and the Coast 
Guard Need to Improve Their Capabilities to Assess Racial Disparities 19 (2020) [hereinaf-
ter GAO Racial Disparity Report] (statement of Brenda S. Farrell, Dir., Def. Capabilities and 
Mgmt.); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-
92, § 540I, 133 Stat. 1198, 1369–71 (2019) (directing the Secretary of Defense to report the 
race, ethnicity, and gender of the victim and the accused in courts-martial, to establish cri-
teria to determine when data indicating racial disparity should be further reviewed, and to 
take action to remedy racial inequality in the military legal system). 
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exploration.15 The tone-deaf responses from senior Department of 
Defense (DOD) officials echoed a DOD study that had reached the same 
conclusion some fifty years earlier.16 
The cycle of injustice, then, is that servicemembers are promised ben-
efits and, once enlisted, exposed to serious health hazards such as PTSD, 
TBI, and other mental health disorders.17 When they exhibit symptoms 
                                                                                                                                
 15. See Barry K. Robinson & Edgar Chen, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Racial Disparity in 
the Military Justice System, Just Sec. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72424/ 
deja-vu-all-over-again-racial-disparity-in-the-military-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/EV4 
6-BMZ4] (“Despite these jarring statistics, the GAO testified that it was not in a position to 
determine whether these figures were the result of unlawful discrimination.”). 
 16. See id. (noting that, in 1972, a task force commissioned by President Richard 
Nixon found that inadequate educational advancement opportunities and lack of diversity 
in the leadership corps drove racial disparities in the military justice system). Recent events, 
too, underscore the problem of institutionalized racism in the military. On January 6, 2021, 
a mob of President Donald Trump’s supporters invaded the U.S. Capitol, resulting in the 
death of five Americans. Among the mob of violent and armed protesters were military vet-
erans with training and expertise, some in full tactical gear, who played an instrumental role 
in the attack on elected officials, including the Vice President, while Congress was engaged 
in carrying out its constitutional duties. See, e.g., Air Force Vet Photographed in Capitol 
Riot Arrest in Texas, Mil. Times (Jan. 10, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/your-military/2021/01/11/air-force-vet-photographed-in-capitol-riot-arrested-in-texas/ 
[https://perma.cc/L8YL-Z7Y9] (reporting that retired Air Force Lt. Col. Larry Randall 
Brock, Jr. was charged in the District of Columbia on one count of entering or remaining in 
a restricted building without lawful authority and one count of violent entry on Capitol 
grounds); Michael Biesecker, Jake Bleiberg & James Laporta, Capitol Rioters Included 
Highly Trained Ex-Military and Cops, AP News (Jan. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article 
/ex-military-cops-us-capitol-riot-a1cb17201dfddc98291edead5badc257 [https://perma.cc/ 
LQ4D-5CGN]; Rob Kuznia & Ashley Fantz, They Swore to Protect America. Some Also 
Joined the Riot, CNN (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/12/us/military-
extremism-capitol-riot-invs/index.html [https://perma.cc/PY6L-2J5Q]. A 2019 Military 
Times survey of its readers found that more than one-third of active-duty troops and half of 
servicemembers of color had personally witnessed examples of white nationalism or racism 
in recent months. See Leo Shane III, Signs of White Supremacy, Extremism Up Again in 
Poll of Active-Duty Troops, Mil. Times (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/pentagon-congress/2020/02/06/signs-of-white-supremacy-extremism-up-again-in-poll-
of-active-duty-troops/ [https://perma.cc/MSC2-M5NX] (describing examples of white na-
tionalist or ideologically driven racism such as swastikas drawn on servicemembers’ cars, 
stickers supporting the Ku Klux Klan, and Nazi-style salutes between individuals); see also 
Kim Hjelmgaard, Secret Audio Recordings Detail How White Supremacists Seek Recruits 
From Military, Police, USA Today (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
2020/10/15/splc-releases-audio-how-neo-nazi-group-recruits-military-police/3661460001/ 
[https://perma.cc/9F2R-NCC4]; Military, Veterans, and Society Program, Virtual 
Roundtable: A Conversation on Race in the Military, Ctr. for a New Am. Sec. (Sept. 23, 
2020), https://www.cnas.org/events/virtual-roundtable-a-conversation-on-race-in-the-military 
[https://perma.cc/TF64-Y4NP]. 
 17. See generally Lisa K. Richardson, B. Christopher Frueh & Ronald Acierno, 
Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Critical Review, 
44 Austl. & N.Z. J. Psychiatry 4, 5, 15 (2010) (reporting that the prevalence of combat-related 
PTSD in U.S. military veterans since the Vietnam War ranges from about 2% to 17%). The 
prevalence of PTSD among servicemembers and veterans is difficult to determine due to 
underreporting and differences in diagnosing, sampling, and measurement strategies. See 
id. at 12 (attributing the considerable variability in the results of the study to differences in 
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related to these illnesses in the form of misconduct, they are drawn into 
the military legal system. Statistics show that this is twice as likely to happen 
to servicemembers of color than to white servicemembers.18 Involvement 
in the military legal system is then used as a basis for discharge and rec-
orded as an LTH discharge in official records, creating a lifelong stigma of 
dishonorable service for the veterans.19 
Much has been written about the collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions that prevent individuals with criminal histories from becoming 
productive members of society.20 Less well understood, however, are the 
                                                                                                                                
sampling strategies and measurement strategies). Generally, the rate of PTSD among veter-
ans varies by military conflict. Id. at 2 (listing findings of PTSD prevalence rates among vet-
erans of the Vietnam War, Gulf War, and conflict in the Middle East). According to one 
major study of Vietnam veterans, 15.2% of male veterans and 8.5% of female veterans suf-
fered from PTSD at the time of the 1988 study. Richard A. Kulka, William E. Schlenger, John 
A. Fairbank, Richard L. Hough, B. Kathleen Jordan, Charles R. Marmar & Daniel S. Weiss, 
Trauma and the Vietnam War Generation: Report of Findings From the National Vietnam 
Veterans Readjustment Study 52 (Routledge 2013) (1990). Researchers estimated 30.9% of 
males and 26.9% of females had suffered from PTSD at some time in their lives. Id. at 53. 
According to the VA, in any given year, about 11% to 20% of veterans from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Desert Storm (the Gulf War) re-
ceive a PTSD diagnosis. How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, PTSD: Nat’l Ctr. for PTSD, 
U.S. Dep’t of Veteran Affs., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_ 
veterans.asp [https://perma.cc/UN9T-K989] (last visited July 27, 2021). Moreover, PTSD is 
more prevalent in the military population than in the general population. See Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder, Nat’l All. on Mental Illness, https://www.nami.org/About-Mental-Illness/ 
Mental-Health-Conditions/Posttraumatic-Stress-Disorder/ [https://perma.cc/2BAF-BFSJ] (last 
visited July 27, 2021) (noting that PTSD affects about 3.6% of the U.S. adult population). 
 18. GAO Racial Disparity Report, supra note 14, at 15. 
 19. See Dana Montalto, Bradford Adams, Barton Stichman & Drew Ensign, Veterans 
Legal Clinic, Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harvard L. Sch., Underserved: How the VA Wrongfully 
Excludes Veterans With Bad Paper 2–3 (2016), https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5ddda3d7 
ad8b1151b5d16cff/5e67da6782e5f4e6b19760b0_Underserved.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R 
UB-TG49] [hereinafter Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved] (“In 2013, VA Regional Offices 
labeled 90% of veterans with bad paper discharges as ‘Dishonorable’—even though the mil-
itary chose not to Dishonorably discharge them.”). PTSD receives much media attention, 
though veterans suffer from other war-related mental health disorders as well. PTSD symp-
toms often coexist with depression, anxiety, and substance use. Symptoms usually begin 
within three months after experiencing a traumatic event, but symptoms may occasionally 
emerge years later. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, supra note 17. Because of the potential 
latency of PTSD symptoms, a servicemember could be diagnosed with depression and anxi-
ety during service but not develop or manifest the full symptoms of PTSD until after dis-
charge. A related but separate problem involves the discharge of servicemembers for 
“personality disorders,” which do not qualify for VA disability compensation. Between 2001 
and 2015, more than 31,000 servicemembers were separated with a personality disorder des-
ignation. See Joshua Kors, Investigative Reporter Alissa Figueroa Exposes Stunning Flaws in 
Veterans’ Benefits System, HuffPost (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/ 
investigative-reporter-al_b_6382880 [https://perma.cc/4QS2-93TU] (last updated Dec. 6, 
2017). 
 20. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record 226 (2015) (“Employment 
discrimination has always made it especially difficult for an ex-convict to avoid resorting to 
crime as a necessary means of survival.”); Margaret Colgate Love, Jenny Roberts & Wayne 
A. Logan, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Law, Policy and Practice 
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collateral consequences of LTH discharges that create barriers to obtain-
ing healthcare, disability compensation, education, housing, employment, 
and other transitional necessities for veterans.21 This Essay adds to the dis-
course on military discharges by examining the collateral consequences of 
discharge characterizations through a criminal law lens.22 This Essay ar-
gues that while discharges are technically administrative actions, they have 
been doing the work of criminal convictions in the military for some time. 
Since World War II, the lines between administrative action and criminal 
punishment have become increasingly blurred.23 Today, veterans who are 
disciplined through either process continue to be punished long after ser-
vice through the collateral consequences of their military service.24 In this 
way, they share a hardship experienced by people involved in the criminal 
                                                                                                                                
§§ 1.11–1.12 (2018–2019 ed.) [hereinafter Love et al., Collateral Consequences] 
(describing the legal and reputational collateral consequences of criminal convictions); 
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1789, 1818 (2012) [hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death] 
(arguing that civil death, an obsolete form of civil punishment, has reemerged in the form 
of a change in legal status of persons involved in the criminal legal system); Michael 
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and 
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Collateral Consequences] 
(stating that individuals with criminal histories are confronted with a range of collateral 
consequences including ineligibility for public housing, welfare benefits, student loans, and 
employment opportunities). 
 21. See John W. Brooker, Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond “T.B.D.”: 
Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following 
Involuntary or Punitive Discharge From the Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2012) 
(“The military, through its discharge process, is creating huge handicaps to readjustment 
and reintegration into society by limiting the possibility of care and failing to at the least 
stabilize these warriors before their rough ejection.”); Liam Brennan, How Veterans Affairs 
Denies Care to Many of the People It’s Supposed to Serve, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-veterans-affairs-denies-care-to-many-of-the- 
people-its-supposed-to-serve/2019/11/08/2c105b48-0183-11ea-9518-1e76abc088b6_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/sn7f-755d] (“These former service members [discharged as other than 
honorable] are often excluded from VA health care, from VA housing if they are homeless, 
from VA benefits payments even if they’re disabled by their service and from the educational 
supports provided to other veterans.”). 
 22. Recent scholarship on discharge review has focused on the service departments’ 
failure to apply favorable standards of review for veterans with PTSD and TBI who are seek-
ing discharge upgrades. See, e.g., Jessica Lynn Wherry, Kicked Out, Kicked Again: The 
Discharge Review Boards’ Illiberal Application of Liberal Consideration for Veterans With 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1357, 1387 (2019). Scholars have also crit-
icized VA’s exclusionary eligibility criteria for receipt of veterans’ benefits. See, e.g., 
Bradford Adams & Dana Montalto, With Malice Toward None: Revisiting the Historical and 
Legal Basis for Excluding Veterans From “Veteran” Services, 122 Penn St. L. Rev. 69, 134 
(2017). 
 23. See Stephanie Smith Ledesma, PTSD and Bad Paper Discharges: Why the Fairness 
to Soldiers Act Is Too Little, Too Late, 10 Elon L. Rev. 189, 227 (2018) (noting that com-
manders commonly circumvent constitutional protections of servicemembers by using ad-
ministrative discharges to remove troops from service). 
 24. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40 (describing the story of a veteran who was 
denied access to medical care more than five years after receiving an other-than-honorable 
discharge). 
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legal system. The movement to limit the collateral consequences of crimi-
nal arrests and convictions has much to offer military justice. 
Part I of this Essay provides an overview of the current law, regulations, 
and policy governing the military discharge system. It also discusses the 
military’s increasing use of administrative discharges in lieu of courts-mar-
tial to address minor misconduct. Part II examines the collateral conse-
quences of criminal convictions, their disproportionate effects on commu-
nities of color, and their invisible role in the criminal legal system.25 It 
examines recent advances at the state and local level to ease the undue 
weight and burden that criminal convictions place on individuals. It then 
draws lessons from these advances to argue that the collateral conse-
quences of military discharges, which are strikingly similar to those of crim-
inal convictions, must be addressed, and their disproportionate effect on 
disabled veterans eliminated. Part III explores solutions to the military’s 
collateral consequences problem, analyzing efforts by DOD to adopt a 
clemency approach to discharge review, and examines other proposals to 
adopt a more redemptive approach to collateral consequences. This Essay 
concludes that a multifaceted approach is necessary, and it must include 
the codification of DOD’s clemency guidance, broader access to VA bene-
fits for veterans with LTH discharges, and statewide efforts to reduce the 
effects of discharge characterizations on employment. 
I. DISCHARGE CHARACTERIZATIONS 
The military has long been an attractive option for young adults look-
ing to escape the confines of poverty, racial inequality, family strife, or the 
dearth of employment opportunities in their local communities.26 For 
these individuals, the opportunity for economic security is hard to pass up. 
In exchange for their service, the military promises them competitive sal-
aries and a generous benefits package, including disability compensation 
for injuries sustained in service.27 Most servicemembers, however, are not 
                                                                                                                                
 25. See Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences, in 4 Reforming Criminal Justice: 
Punishment, Incarceration, and Release 371, 372 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (explaining that the 
negative consequences for people convicted of a crime are perpetuated by being labeled as 
a criminal and subjected to collateral consequences even after release from incarceration). 
 26. John Bowden, Ocasio-Cortez Calls for End to Federal Funding for Military 
Recruitment in Schools, Hill (July 27, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/budget 
-appropriations/509218-ocasio-cortez-calls-for-end-to-federal-funding-for/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5ZKN-MY9W] (arguing that the Army and Navy target high school students in low-income 
communities for enlistment, often using popular video games, such as Call of Duty: Warzone, 
in their recruitment messaging). 
 27. See Brian Martucci, Joining the Military After High School—Benefits & Risks, 
Money Crashers (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.moneycrashers.com/joining-military-benefits-
risks/ [https://perma.cc/46HR-SWM4] (describing the rewards of military service, includ-
ing finding purpose, serving the country, tuition assistance, training, travel, competitive sal-
ary, enlistment bonuses, and post-service benefits, but acknowledging the risks of death or 
physical and mental injury). 
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informed that these benefits are conditioned on the award of an honora-
ble discharge characterization.28 They do not understand that the process 
of awarding service characterizations, a status that military commanders 
confer upon servicemembers at the time of discharge, is wrought with in-
equities, and that benefits promised at enlistment are denied to those with 
LTH discharges.29 This section provides an overview of the discharge pro-
cess, with a focus on the military’s increasing reliance on LTH administra-
tive discharges as a means to hastily separate servicemembers for minor 
misconduct, thereby denying them the benefits promised at the time of 
their enlistment. 
A. Military Discharges 
Most servicemembers are authorized to leave the military after com-
pleting their service obligation.30 Those who are discharged or released 
from military duty prior to the expiration of their terms of service require 
special authorization.31 DOD provides general discharge guidance to the 
military departments through regulations and policy memoranda but del-
egates the authority to discharge servicemembers to the service secretar-
ies.32 Discharges are divided into two broad categories: voluntary and 
involuntary.33 Voluntary discharges may be authorized for hardship, preg-
nancy, schooling, and a variety of other reasons.34 Involuntary discharges 
occur when the military releases a servicemember from duty against their 
will because of misconduct or because the member lacks the potential for 
further service.35 This Essay focuses on involuntary discharges because they 
are more likely to result in OTH discharge characterizations. 
                                                                                                                                
 28. Umar Moulta-Ali & Sidath Viranga Panangala, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43928, Veterans’ 
Benefits: The Impact of Military Discharges on Basic Eligibility 15–16 (2015) (depicting a 
flowchart used to determine the limited circumstances under which a veteran with an OTH 
discharge might be eligible for benefits). 
 29. Wherry, supra note 22, at 1368. 
 30. See DOPMA/ROPMA Policy Reference Tool: Military Service Obligation and 
Active Duty Service Obligation, Rand Corp., http://dopma-ropma.rand.org/military-service-
obligation.html [https://perma.cc/R3EK-B9FR] (last visited July 27, 2021) (listing the dif-
ferent service obligations and their accompanying federal statutes for each branch of the 
military). 
 31. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at para. 1.1 (“No member may be discharged 
or released before expiration of term of service (ETS) except as prescribed by the Secretary 
of the Air Force, by sentence of court-martial, or as otherwise prescribed by law.”). 
 32. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, enclo-
sure 5 (Jan. 27, 2014) [hereinafter DODDI 1332.14] (describing how each military depart-
ment has its own discharge regulations that comply with DOD instructions). 
 33. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at tbls.1.2 & 1.3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. U.S. Air Force, The Judge Advocate General’s School, The Military Commander 
and the Law 75 (17th ed. 2021), https://www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/documents/ 
Publications/MCL%202021.pdf?ver=ong1RuaOkGtvCugyNeniLA%3d%3d [https://perma 
.cc/ZC8P-DQW4] [hereinafter The Military Commander and the Law]. 
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1. Punitive Discharges. — Of the two types of involuntary discharges,36 
punitive discharges, the more severe form of punishment, may only be au-
thorized through courts-martial and may be characterized as either a bad 
conduct discharge or dishonorable discharge.37 Punitive discharge charac-
terizations are intended to be stigmatizing and to reflect the criminal be-
havior and poor duty performance of the servicemember.38 Because of its 
stigma, a punitive discharge is considered by servicemembers to be the 
most serious sanction that the military can impose.39 
2. Administrative Discharges. — In contrast, an administrative dis-
charge is a personnel action. It is executed through a streamlined admin-
istrative process that affords considerably less due process to 
servicemembers than courts-martial.40 Because of their expediency, admin-
istrative discharges are by far the more common form of involuntary dis-
charge.41 A servicemember can receive an administrative discharge under 
honorable, general (under honorable conditions), or OTH conditions.42 
                                                                                                                                
 36. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 2(c). For a historical per-
spective on discharge characterizations, see Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 74. The 
practice of characterizing servicemembers’ discharges was borrowed from the British. In the 
late eighteenth century, during the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress adopted 
the British practice of separating soldiers with honorable or dishonorable characterizations. 
See Bradley K. Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical 
Evaluation, 59 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1973). Much like today, the dishonorable discharge was 
rarely used, reserved only for servicemembers who committed grave offenses, and could 
only be imposed by order of a general court-martial. In the late nineteenth century, the 
military adopted administrative discharges as a means for commanders to discharge service-
members for various reasons without holding a court-martial. These reasons included un-
suitability for service, unfitness, misconduct, for the good of the service, and general 
conduct falling between honorable and dishonorable. See Harry V. Lerner, Effect of 
Character of Discharge and Length of Service on Eligibility to Veterans’ Benefits, 13 Mil. L. 
Rev. 121, 132 (1961). Character of discharges have always played an important role in the 
determination of military pensions and other benefits. 
 37. Manual For Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1003(b)(8) (2019). A court-mar-
tial is the equivalent of a civilian criminal court. A dishonorable discharge may only be im-
posed by order of a general court-martial, the highest level of trial court in the military. Id. 
at 1003(b)(8)(B); see also Richard J. Bednar, Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the 
Armed Forces, 16 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1962). 
 38. Christopher H. Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 
Yale L.J. 33, 35 (1973) (noting that though dishonorable discharges and bad conduct dis-
charges are expressly punitive, a general discharge characterization constitutes “a stigma of 
tremendous impact which [has] a lifelong effect” and creates a “definite disadvantage” to 
veterans seeking civilian employment). 
 39. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 74 (“[T]his classification has always been 
reserved for the most severe misconduct and remains relatively rare.”). 
 40. See Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 135, 159 (2016) (“Unfortunately, there is no clear, uniform definition of what miscon-
duct will result in an OTH discharge, and each military branch has separate guidance.”). 
 41. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 50 (noting that OTH 
discharges account for 5.8% of all characterized discharges while punitive discharges ac-
count for about 1% of discharges). 
 42. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3(a)(1)(a). 
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DOD provides broad definitions for these terms, though each military 
branch defines these terms slightly differently.43 Navy regulations state that 
honorable service “generally [meets] the standard of acceptable conduct 
and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that 
any other characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate.”44 
DOD defines OTH service as “[c]onduct involving one or more acts or omis-
sions that constitute a significant departure from the conduct expected of 
members of Naval Service.”45 The definitions of these terms among the ser-
vices are generally the same despite their subtle differences.46 
3. Distinctions Between Punitive and Administrative Discharges. — The 
distinctions between administrative and punitive discharges can be confus-
ing, even for servicemembers. Discharge characterizations are recorded 
on an official discharge document known as the “DD-214,” memorializing 
both the character of discharge (e.g., “other-than-honorable”) and the 
narrative reason for discharge (e.g., “misconduct”).47 Both punitive and 
administrative discharges use service characterizations to denote miscon-
duct or problematic service, making the labels a source of confusion. Ser-
vicemembers are generally familiar with the term “dishonorable 
discharge” and its connotations but are less familiar with the tiers of ad-
ministrative discharge characterizations.48 A thorough understanding of 
the collateral effects of both is immensely important, especially when a 
servicemember accused of misconduct is offered a discharge in lieu of a 
court-martial during pretrial plea bargaining.49 
                                                                                                                                
 43. Id. at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a). The Secretary of Defense has authorized each 
service branch to promulgate its own standards for discharges. Each branch has a slightly 
different definition for the types of service characterizations, but all the branches generally 
follow the DOD definition. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & U.S. Coast Guard, 
COMDTINST M1000.4, Military Separations (Aug. 21, 2018); U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 
635-200, Active Duty Enlisted Administrative Separations, paras. 3–4 (Dec. 19, 2016) [here-
inafter AR 635-200]; U.S. Marine Corps, MCO P1900.16F, Separation and Retirement 
Manual, para. 1004 (2013); U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual 
(Milsperson) 1910-100 (2002). 
 44. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Military Personnel Manual (Milsperson) 1910-304, para. 1 
(June 30, 2008). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Wherry, supra note 22, at 1368. 
 47. See e.g., Certificate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Army, https://www.dhrm.virginia.gov/docs/default-source/veteran-related/dd214-sample. 
pdf?sfvrsn=2/ [https://perma.cc/X25P-XHCV] (last visited July 27, 2021) (showing an ex-
ample of a DD-214). 
 48. See Daniel Scapardine, Note, Leaving “Other Than Honorable” Soldiers Behind: 
How the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Inadvertently Created a Health and 
Social Crisis, 76 Md. L. Rev. 1133, 1137 (2017) (describing how OTH veterans require com-
petent and effective representation in order to successfully navigate the discharge petition 
process). 
 49. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 3, para. 11(a) (noting that a ser-
vicemember may request to be discharged in lieu of standing trial in order to avoid the 
possibility of a conviction and its collateral consequences). 
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The authority to discipline and separate servicemembers rests with 
military “commanders.”50 Commanders have tremendous discretion to 
criminally charge or administratively separate servicemembers for miscon-
duct.51 As Mr. Gonzalez’s case demonstrates, the discretion is sometimes 
abused. How could a soldier with an obvious case of mental illness be 
discharged for misconduct and given an OTH service characterization 
rather than a medical discharge? Even though Mr. Gonzalez’s misconduct 
can be attributed to mental illness, commanders may choose from these 
basic options when acting in such cases: (1) court-martial, (2) nonjudicial 
punishment,52 (3) administrative action, (4) medical discharge,53 or a 
combination of these options.54 
Mr. Gonzalez’s commander chose nonjudicial Article 15 punishment 
and an OTH discharge to resolve Mr. Gonzalez’s situation. Although a 
medical discharge may have been more appropriate, the discharge system 
favors misconduct separations over medical separations.55 A number of ex-
traordinary events must occur for a servicemember to be discharged for 
medical reasons rather than for misconduct.56 The process begins when 
the servicemember’s unit commander initiates discharge proceedings 
based on the servicemember’s misconduct.57 Servicemembers discharged 
                                                                                                                                
 50. See Michael Moran, Modern Military Force Structures, Council on Foreign Rels. 
(Oct. 26, 2006), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modern-military-force-structures [https 
://perma.cc/SWG8-SL94] (explicating the current command structure of the military in-
cluding ground forces which are organized by squad, platoon, company, battalion, regi-
ment, brigade, division, and corps, each led by commanding officers); see also Stuart 
Johnson, John E. Peters, Karin E. Kitchens, Aaron L. Martin & Jordan R. Fischbach, RAND 
Nat’l Defense Rsch. Inst., A Review of the Army’s Modular Force Structure 2 (2012), https:/ 
/www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR927-2.html [https://perma.cc/PXR2-WMYC] 
(reporting on the Army’s transition to a “modular” force structure to address the challenges 
of waging war and conducting extended stabilization operations); The Military Commander 
and the Law, supra note 35, at 3 (describing the military command structure).  
 51. Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command Influence, 93 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1401, 
1403–04 (2016) (comparing prosecutorial misconduct in the military and civilian systems). 
 52. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (2018). Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ is 
often a precursor to administrative separation. 
 53. See, e.g., AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(a). Since the late 1980s, the mil-
itary has significantly increased its mental health screening and treatment for servicemem-
bers with mental health disorders. Today, all servicemembers returning from deployment 
are required to be screened for mental health problems and are required to complete an-
nual suicide awareness training. 
 54. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at para. 6.43 (explaining that a commander 
may process a recommendation for discharge as a single action when the recommendation 
is made for more than one reason). 
 55. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33; see also U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 635-
40, Disability Evaluation for Retention, Retirement, or Separation, para. 4-3 (Jan. 19, 2017), 
[hereinafter AR 635-40] (noting that criminal or administrative processing for misconduct 
takes precedence over medical separations). 
 56. See AR 635-40, supra note 55, at para. 4-3 (outlining the process for obtaining 
medical discharge compared to discharge for misconduct). 
 57. See id. 
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for misconduct are required to obtain both a physical exam and a mental 
status evaluation.58 Medical separations take precedence over other ad-
ministrative separations except for misconduct separations, which are pro-
cessed concurrently with medical separations.59 If a medical treatment 
facility commander or attending medical officer determines that a soldier 
does not meet the medical fitness standards for retention, the servicemem-
ber is referred to a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB) for an official medi-
cal fitness determination.60 Even if the MEB finds that the servicemember 
is not medically qualified for service, the servicemember may still be dis-
charged for misconduct if a higher-level commander determines that the 
servicemember’s medical condition is not “the direct and substantial con-
tributing cause” of the misconduct.61 
Though a medical discharge may seem like the obvious choice in Mr. 
Gonzalez’s case, three main factors drive commanders’ decisions to opt for 
administrative discharges based on misconduct rather than medical rea-
sons.62 First, misconduct discharges are exponentially faster than medical 
                                                                                                                                
 58. 10 U.S.C. § 1145(a)(5) (2018). This was not always the case. Prior to 2017, medical 
exams were not routinely provided to servicemembers facing discharge. For example, the 
Navy did not require a medical exam or screening for a servicemember separating in lieu 
of facing a trial by court-martial. Although the services are now required to provide medical 
exams prior to separating servicemembers for misconduct, the services have not adhered to 
the statutory requirement. See GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11, at 16–22. 
 59. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(a). Commanders have discretion to dis-
charge servicemembers for misconduct rather than for medical reasons, presumably to 
maintain good order and discipline in their units. Id. at para. 2-2(3)(c). 
 60. Id. at para. 1-33(b)(1); AR 635-40, supra note 55, at para 4-3; see also U.S. Dep’t of 
the Army, Reg. 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, ch. 3 (outlining the disqualifying med-
ical conditions and/or physical defects that disqualify soldiers from further military service). 
 61. AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-33(b)(1)(a)–(b). The ultimate decision is 
reserved for the General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA), usually one of the 
highest-ranking commanders assigned to a military installation. The GCMCA must consider 
multiple factors before discharging a servicemember for medical reasons. A GCMCA may 
only direct that a servicemember be discharged through the medical disability channels 
when UCMJ action has not been initiated and when (1) the servicemember’s medical con-
dition is “the direct and substantial contributing cause” of the misconduct or (2) other cir-
cumstances warrant disability processing over misconduct processing. Id. If the GCMCA 
believes that the circumstances warrant a medical discharge, they must refer the case to a 
Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) for a determination of whether the soldier meets criteria 
for physical disability out-processing. Id. at para. 1-33(b)(1). If the GCMCA elects not to 
refer the case to the PEB, or if the PEB does not find that the soldier meets criteria for 
disability out-processing, the unit commander may continue discharging the soldier for mis-
conduct. See id. at para. 1-33(b)(3)(b)(1). 
 62. In Mr. Gonzalez’s case, a number of factors worked against his receipt of a medical 
discharge. See Memorandum from Colonel Keith A. Smith, Physical Evaluation Bd., to Dep’t 
of Veterans Affs. (Apr. 11, 2014) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). First, misconduct 
discharges were faster and simpler for unit commanders to execute because they did not 
require the approval of the GCMCA. See AR 635-200, supra note 43, at para. 1-19(b)(2)(a). 
Second, at least three medical determinations must have been made to show that Mr. 
Gonzalez met the criteria for a medical discharge, including determinations by the out-pro-
cessing medical officer, MEB, and PEB. Finally, even if Mr. Gonzalez met the medical criteria 
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discharges. Units are able to expel and replace troops and return to full 
end-strength faster if they opt for a misconduct discharge than if they elect 
to medically discharge their troops.63 Second, misconduct discharges are 
less burdensome on unit leadership and are a convenient way to remove 
“problem” troops from service.64 Finally, commanders may be concerned 
about the erosion of “good order and discipline” in their units and may 
elect a misconduct discharge to address particular problems or to ratchet 
up discipline in their units.65 
B. The Rise of Administrative Discharges 
Administrative discharges have long been closely associated with the 
military’s criminal legal system, though they have never been formally rec-
ognized as part of it.66 When a servicemember receives judicial or nonjudi-
cial Article 15 punishment, the action is often followed by an administrative 
                                                                                                                                
for discharge, the GCMCA could have decided that Mr. Gonzalez’s mental health was not a 
direct and substantial cause of the misconduct and chosen not to intervene with a discharge 
for misconduct. See id. at para. 1-33(b). Mr. Gonzalez’s case is like many other soldiers’ cases 
in that he met the criteria for a medical discharge but the GCMCA declined to intervene. 
That is, Mr. Gonzalez was found not medically qualified during a medical and mental health 
out-processing exam and, subsequently, an MEB and PEB determined that he was eligible 
for a medical discharge. Id. The GCMCA, however, did not believe that Mr. Gonzalez’s med-
ical condition was a substantial factor in his misconduct and therefore discharged him for 
misconduct instead of medical reasons. 
 63. The pressure to administratively separate troops rather than to diagnose and treat 
them is based on military readiness concerns. “Readiness” is a term used to articulate the 
preparedness of a unit. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at para. 3. A servicemember under-
going the lengthy medical discharge process will stay on a unit’s rolls much longer than a 
servicemember who is discharged for misconduct. Compare id. at enclosure 7, para. 7(a)(1) 
(“Processing goals should not exceed 15 working days for the notification procedure . . . .”), 
with U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1332.38, Physical Disability Evaluation, enclosure 3, para. 1.6.1 
(Nov. 14, 1996) [hereinafter DODDI 1332.38] (“All members shall be referred for evalua-
tion within one year of the diagnosis of their medical condition if they are unable to return 
to military duty.”). While awaiting medical out-processing, the servicemember may not be 
able to perform their regular duties, thus reducing the readiness of the unit. See DODDI 
1332.38, supra, at enclosure 3, para. 3.2.1 (“A Service member shall be considered unfit 
when the evidence establishes that the member, due to physical disability, is unable to rea-
sonably perform the duties of his or her office, grade, rank, or rating . . . .”). 
 64. See Geoff Ziezulewicz, UCMJ Crackdown: Why Mattis Thinks Commanders Have 
Gone Soft on Misconduct, Mil. Times (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/ 
news/your-military/2018/09/10/ucmj-crackdown-why-mattis-thinks-commanders-have-gone-
soft-on-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/MNZ9-GRJA] (“Administrative discipline tends to 
be bureaucratically easier and less time-consuming than traditional UCMJ measures to pun-
ish misconduct.”). 
 65. See Jeremy S. Weber, The Disorderly, Undisciplined State of the “Good Order and 
Discipline” Term 7–16 (Feb. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“[T]heir answers essentially just equated good order and discipline with unity of 
command—in other words, military commanders should be responsible for military justice 
decisions because commanders handle important issues in their units.” (footnote omitted)). 
 66. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 76 (noting that in the late nineteenth 
century, the military began expanding the types of discharges beyond honorable and dis-
honorable to permit a “more nuanced assessment of conduct” and that these administrative 
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discharge.67 For example, an administrative discharge is routinely issued 
subsequent to a court-martial conviction when the servicemember’s sen-
tence does not include a punitive discharge.68 In misconduct cases not in-
volving a court-martial, such as if the servicemember received a series of 
counseling letters and an Article 15, a discharge is often the final adminis-
trative action.69 Despite the close relationship between administrative dis-
charges and punitive action, discharges are rarely discussed in plea 
negotiations even though the parties are fully aware that pleading to crimi-
nal charges almost always results in a discharge.70 DOD maintains that ad-
ministrative discharges are not punitive.71 As stated in DOD regulations, 
administrative discharges promote the readiness of the military and provide 
a means to evaluate the suitability of servicemembers based on their ability 
to meet required performance, conduct, and disciplinary standards.72 
Recent trends show an increase in the military’s use of administrative 
discharges.73 Between 2007 and 2017, the number of courts-martial declined 
                                                                                                                                
discharges were made available to commanders without resort to courts-martial or judicial 
process). 
 67. See Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice: Unintended Consequences of Military 
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. Rev. 115, 137 (2007) (“An Article 15 or summary court-
martial conviction for drug use or possession generally results in an administrative discharge 
from the military, but does not trigger the same collateral consequences as a parallel misde-
meanor or felony drug conviction in the civilian court system.”). 
 68. See, e.g., AFI 36-3208, supra note 12, at paras. 5.48–5.52 (recommending OTH 
discharge characterizations for a broad array of ill-defined misconduct such as a pattern of 
misconduct, discreditable involvement with military or civil authorities, conduct prejudicial 
to good order and discipline, civilian convictions, commission of serious offenses, and sex-
ual assault and requiring discharges in certain cases); see also National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, § 572, 126 Stat 1632, 1754 (2013) 
(explaining that the Secretary of each military department must ensure that policies con-
form with the removal of members of the Armed Forces when the member has received a 
final offense, even if it is not a punitive discharge); DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at en-
closure 2, para. 2(f) (“[E]nlisted Service members who are convicted of a covered sexual 
offense and are not punitively discharged are processed for administrative separation in 
accordance with section 572(a)(2) of Reference (c), as described in the procedures of this 
instruction.”). 
 69. See, e.g., 7th Bomb Wing Legal Off. & 7th Bomb Wing Pub. Affs., Article 15 and 
Discharge Actions, Dyess A.F. Base (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.dyess.af.mil/News/Article-
Display/Article/1151399/article-15-and-discharge-actions/ [https://perma.cc/JMF3-QKC9] 
(reporting administrative disciplinary action and discharges for March 2017). 
 70. Jeff A. Bovarnick, Plea Bargaining in the Military, 27 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 95, 96 (2014) 
(“After a lengthy discussion with his defense counsel, the soldier now realizes that based on 
his crimes, his career in the military is essentially over. The soldier’s primary concern is 
limiting his jail time.”). 
 71. See DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3 (“Prior service activities, 
including records of conviction by court-martial, records of absence without leave, or com-
mission of other offenses for which punishment was not imposed will not be considered on 
the issue of characterization.”). 
 72. Id. at para. 3(a). 
 73. See Jeremy R. Bedford, Other Than Honorable Discharges: Unfair and Unjust 
Life Sentences of Decreased Earning Capacity, 6 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Affs. 687, 721–22 
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by nearly 70%.74 Nonjudicial Article 15 punishment declined by almost 
40%.75 Experts attributed the declines to a variety of factors, including 
commanders’ preference to discharge rather than seek justice, an 
institutional focus on prosecuting resource-intensive rape and sexual 
assault crimes, and an overall decline in the commission of serious of-
fenses.76 Meanwhile, the number of administrative discharges has contin-
ued to rise. Since World War II, the percentage of servicemembers who 
receive OTH discharges has increased fivefold, from about 1% of all 
veterans with characterized discharges during the World War II era to 5.8% 
of veterans in the post-9/11 era.77 VA has denied services to roughly 6.5% 
of veterans who have served since 2001, or about 125,000 veterans to 
date.78 
The increase in administrative discharges has drawn the ire of military 
leadership.79 In a 2018 memo, Secretary of Defense James Mattis reminded 
commanders of the power of the judicial system. He instructed command-
ers to choose the “harder right over the easier wrong” and not default to 
less burdensome administrative actions to instill discipline in American 
                                                                                                                                
(2021) (suggesting that commanders are resorting to OTH discharges rather than courts-
martial as a means of redressing misconduct). 
 74. Evan R. Seamone, James McGuire, Shoba Sreenivasan, Sean Clark, Daniel Smee & 
Daniel Dow, Moving Upstream: Why Rehabilitative Justice in Military Discharge Proceedings 
Serves a Public Health Interest, 104 Am. J. Pub. Health 1805, 1808 tbl.1.1 (2014) (reporting 
a decline in court-martial cases tried between the Vietnam War era and the Global War on 
Terrorism era); Ziezulewicz, supra note 64. 
 75. Ziezulewicz, supra note 64. 
 76. Id.; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 
114-328, div. E, §§ 5001–5542, 130 Stat. 2000, 2894–968 (2016) (providing various reforms 
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice); Meghann Myers, Here’s What You Need to Know 
About the Biggest Update to UCMJ in Decades, Mil. Times (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www. 
militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/01/15/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-
biggest-update-to-ucmj-in-decades/ [https://perma.cc/A6A8-WMFZ] (discussing the Military 
Justice Act of 2016, a law that significantly changed the court-martial process with the inten-
tion of aligning it with federal district court procedures, all while maintaining due process 
protections for defendants). 
 77. Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 43. During the World War II 
Era, which spanned from 1941 to 1945, approximately 1% of veterans with characterized 
discharges, or about 70,686 out of 6,894,169 servicemembers, received OTH discharges. Id. 
During the post-9/11 Era, spanning from 2002 to 2013, approximately 5.8% of veterans with 
characterized discharges, or about 103,581 out of 1,790,316 servicemembers, received OTH 
discharges. Id. 
 78. Id. at 8. 
 79. Ziezulewicz, supra note 64; see also Eugene R. Fidell, Where Have All the Cases 
Gone?, Glob. Mil. Just. Reform (May 22, 2014), https://globalmjreform.blogspot.com/ 
2014/05/where-have-all-cases-gone.html [https://perma.cc/5N7L-99H5] (discussing the 
decline of courts-martial over the last fifty years); Aaron Mehta, Mattis Wants Commanders 
to Rely More on UCMJ for Disciplinary Problems, Mil. Times (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www. 
militarytimes.com/news/2018/08/14/mattis-wants-commanders-to-rely-more-on-ucmj-for-
disciplinary-problems/ [https://perma.cc/3E4C-97GL] (discussing how former Secretary 
of Defense James Mattis wished to see a more aggressive use of the military justice system). 
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forces.80 Although Secretary Mattis recognized the danger of blurring ad-
ministrative and criminal procedures, his motives were misplaced. The in-
crease in LTH discharges and its effect on the health and wellbeing of 
veterans should be of far greater concern to military leadership than fears 
about soft criminal justice practices. Military leaders must start addressing 
the collateral consequences of their actions and stop downplaying the dev-
astating effects of LTH discharges. 
II. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING THE 
EFFECTS OF ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS TO MILITARY DISCHARGES 
The criminal legal system, with its stigmatizing labels and dispropor-
tionate impact on people of color, offers a useful framework for examining 
military discharges. Scholars have developed a rich body of literature ad-
dressing the collateral consequences of involvement in the criminal legal 
system.81 First, this Part examines the legal consequences of arrests and 
convictions and explores the redemption-focused approaches to reducing 
their impact on economic opportunities and family stability. Then it com-
pares the collateral consequences and redemption-focused approaches of 
the criminal legal system to those of the military discharge system. These 
similarities particularly focus on the stigmatizing effects of adverse 
discharges. 
A. The Criminal Legal System: Collateral Consequences and Redemptive 
Approaches 
1. Collateral Consequences. — In the criminal context, collateral conse-
quences refers to the legal constraints placed on individuals with criminal 
                                                                                                                                
 80. Memorandum from James Mattis, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the 
Mil. Dep’ts, Chiefs of the Mil. Servs., Commanders of the Combatant Commands 1 (Aug. 
13, 2018), https://partner-mco-archive.s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1534283120.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MCF5-8XST]. Declines in UCMJ action stem from commanders’ prefer-
ence for less bureaucratic and time-consuming administrative disciplinary methods. Com-
manders have often complained that UCMJ action reduces military readiness because it 
requires considerable attention from military leadership, often removes the accused, victims, 
and witnesses from their regular duties, affects unit morale, and takes extensive time for reso-
lution. See Bovarnick, supra note 70, at 97 (stating that the “time required by other ‘outside’ 
members of the court-martial process” like the “witnesses, bailiffs, escorts, and most im-
portantly panel members” is a factor in the plea-negotiation process); Ziezulewicz, supra note 64. 
 81. See e.g., Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, §§ 5:1, 5:5; Gabriel J. 
Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional 
Directions, 102 Marq. L. Rev. 233, 233 (2018) [hereinafter Chin, Collateral Consequences 
and Criminal Justice] (explaining the debilitating legal and societal effects of criminal con-
victions); Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, 88 Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1104–
05 (2013) [hereinafter Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence] (describing the formal 
and informal effects of collateral consequences related to criminal convictions); Pinard, 
Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 461 (exploring how collateral consequences in 
the U.S. criminal justice system impede an individual’s life and ability to reintegrate with 
their community after their incarceration). 
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records in the communities to which they return.82 Formal consequences 
include those mandated through laws or regulations, such as limitations 
on accessing housing, employment, and public benefits, as well as voting 
restrictions.83 Informal consequences refer to the “social” consequences 
of a criminal conviction, or those that do not attach by virtue of a legal 
norm but exist because of the perceived negative implications of criminal 
convictions.84 Examples of informal consequences are vast, and include 
landlords and employers who use criminal history as a screening device, 
friends and family who endure secondary stigma as a result of their associ-
ation with convicted individuals, and the secondary effects of imprison-
ment, such as an increased risk of sexual or physical assault and decreased 
access to healthcare.85 Predictably, the combination of formal and infor-
mal consequences has created a permanent underclass of primarily minor-
ity individuals who are excluded from society and who are more likely to 
be stopped, ticketed, arrested, charged, sentenced, and incarcerated than 
any other class of individuals in the United States.86 
                                                                                                                                
 82. See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 1045, 1049 n.13 (referring 
to “civil death” as the condition in which a convicted offender loses all political, civil, and 
legal rights); Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 478 (noting that collateral 
consequences have been referred to as “civil death”); Michael Pinard, Reflections and 
Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1213, 
1214–15 (2010) (framing the extensive collateral consequences problem as a national 
crisis). 
 83. See Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 474. 
 84. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 5:5; Alfred Blumstein & 
Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background 
Checks, 47 Criminology 327, 339–40 (2009); Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, su-
pra note 81, at 1104–05; Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 963, 974 (2013) [hereinafter Pinard, Criminal Records]; Mary 
Swanton, Background Bias: EEOC Steps Up Pressure on Employers That Reject Applicants 
Based on Criminal Records and Credit Scores, Inside Counsel (Apr. 1, 2010), https:// 
www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=222715238 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (condemning the widespread use of criminal records to discriminate against 
people of color). 
 85. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequence, supra note 81, at 1108–09. 
 86. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84, at 967–68; see also Nora V. Demleitner, 
Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing 
Consequences, 11 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 153, 153 (1999) (noting that “upon release from 
prison or discharge from non-incarcerative sentences, many [individuals] find themselves 
internally exiled . . . [and] saddled with restrictions that exclude them from major aspects 
of society”); Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, Prison 
Pol’y Initiative (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https: 
//perma.cc/8ZLJ-GATY] (describing a recursive incarceration trend where “[a]t least 1 in 
4 people who go to jail will be arrested again within the same year”). In 2020, approximately 
2 million people were confined in jails or prisons, up from about 500,000 in 1980. 
Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 237. The increase in 
incarcerations was in large part due to the War on Drugs and many jurisdictions’ “zero-
tolerance” policies. About 75 million Americans have criminal records. Id. at 239. About 
one-third of all individuals in the United States can expect to be arrested by age twenty-
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Collateral consequences are legally imposed by federal, state, and lo-
cal laws in hundreds of jurisdictions across the United States.87 These laws 
make many individuals ineligible for certain jobs, occupational licenses, 
subsidized housing, public benefits, and civil rights, from the right to vote 
to the right to possess firearms.88 Despite their deleterious effects, courts 
have held that many collateral consequences are not so restrictive as to 
constitute punishment and thus are not subject to the Fifth Amendment 
prohibition against double jeopardy or the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment, and that they do not violate ex 
post facto prohibitions.89 Further, courts have reasoned that people with 
convictions do not constitute a suspect class under the equal protection 
doctrine, and as long as legislative constraints on such persons pass ra-
tional basis review, the constraints remain constitutional.90 
                                                                                                                                
three. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84, at 964. In 2015, Black people made up 
13.3% of the population but accounted for 26.6% of arrests. Love et al., Collateral 
Consequences, supra note 20, § 6:9. In 2010, Black people were arrested for marijuana of-
fenses at a rate of 716 per 100,000 individuals, while white people were arrested for the same 
offense at a rate of 192 per 100,000 individuals. Ezekiel Edwards, Will Bunting & Lynda 
Garcia, ACLU, The War on Marijuana in Black and White: Billions of Dollars Wasted on 
Racially Biased Arrests 17 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH7N-4TAV] [hereinafter 
ACLU, The War on Marijuana]. There were 1,717,064 drug arrests in the United States in 
2010. Of these, 889,133 were for marijuana, and 784,021 were for marijuana possession. 
Since 2010, marijuana arrests have decreased by 18%, though that trend has stalled. There 
were more arrests in 2018 than in 2015, despite the passage of decriminalization laws in a 
number of states. See Ezekiel Edwards, Emily Greytak, Brooke Madubuonwu, Thania 
Sanchez, Sophie Beiers, Charlotte Resing, Paige Fernandez & Sagiv Galai, ACLU, A Tale of 
Two Countries: Racially Targeted Arrests in the Era of Marijuana Reform 7 (2020), 
https://www.aclu.org/report/tale-two-countries-racially-targeted-arrests-era-marijuana-reform/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZRC-GVHN]. The arrest rate was substantially disproportional even 
though statistically both groups use marijuana at similar rates across all age groups. See 
Found. for Crim. Just., Nat’l Ass’ of Crim. Def. Laws., Collateral Damage: America’s Failure 
to Forgive or Forget in the War on Crime 23 (2014), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment 
/4a1f16cd-ec82-44f1-a093-798ee1cd7ba3/collateral-damage-america-s-failure-to-forgive-or-
forget-in-the-war-on-crime-a-roadmap-to-restore-rights-and-status-after-arrest-or-conviction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W9CL-M963] [hereinafter Collateral Damage]. Prison statistics are sim-
ilarly disturbing. Studies show that one in three Black males and one in six Latino males will 
spend time in prison at some point in their lives. Pinard, Criminal Records, supra note 84, 
at 968 (comparing this statistic to one in seventeen white males). 
 87. See Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 20, at 1791 (“People convicted of crimes 
are not subject to just one collateral consequence, or even a handful . . . [i]nstead, hundreds 
and sometimes thousands of such consequences apply under federal and state constitutional 
provisions, statutes, administrative regulations, and ordinances.”); Love et al., Collateral 
Consequences, supra note 20, § 4:1; ACLU, The War on Marijuana, supra note 86, at 11. 
 88. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 235. 
 89. Id. at 243. 
 90. Id. Laws denying benefits based on cost-savings reasons have been upheld under 
rational basis review. See, e.g., Houston v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1357, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that denial of assistance to convicted felons and registered sex offenders to con-
serve funds is rational). Denial of licensure and employment for public safety is rational. 
See Rinehart v. La. Dep’t of Corr., No. 93-5624, 1994 WL 395054, at *1, *1 (5th Cir. July 7, 
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Collateral consequences can devastatingly impact employment.91 One 
survey found that 92% of responding employers performed criminal back-
ground checks on at least some job candidates while 73% performed back-
ground checks on every candidate.92 The proliferation of collateral 
consequences and their effect on employment has caused a number of 
organizations to begin tracking their expansion.93 The American Bar 
Association (ABA) created a database of more than 44,778 federal and 
state collateral consequences, 80% of which limit employment opportuni-
ties for those with criminal records.94 Depending on the jurisdiction, vari-
ous laws prohibit persons with criminal records from serving as nurses,95 
                                                                                                                                
1994) (per curiam) (finding employment prohibition rationally related to safety and secu-
rity). Laws related to the promotion of public confidence in government or a regulated 
industry are rational. See, e.g., DiCola v. Food & Drug Admin., 77 F.3d 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (deciding that debarment of convicted felons under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act does not constitute double jeopardy or violate ex post facto clauses). However, categor-
ical disqualifications have been found to be irrational. See Barletta v. Rilling, 973 F. Supp. 
2d 132, 135 (D. Conn. 2013) (finding that disqualification of all persons who have ever been 
convicted of a felony who are seeking licensure for precious metals trading is unconstitu-
tional). A criminal defendant may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
defense counsels’ misadvice about collateral consequences or for failing to warn about the 
possibility of deportation. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (“[C]ounsel 
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth 
Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, 
and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country de-
mand no less.”); State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 538–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“In 
sum, even though predatory-offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty 
plea, affirmative misadvice about such consequences may amount to ineffective assistance 
of counsel.”). 
 91. See generally Devah Pager, Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of 
Mass Incarceration (2007) (chronicling the effects of the “War On Crime” and the subse-
quent employment consequences of mass incarceration); Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 277, 299–300 (2011) (noting that an increase in misdemeanor offense convic-
tions and a decrease in felony convictions has resulted in a net increase in collateral conse-
quences, especially for indigent persons). 
 92. See Collateral Damage, supra note 86, at 22. 
 93. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 9:7 (highlighting how organ-
izations such as the American Bar Association and Uniform Law Commission have compiled 
and organized laws and regulations in various jurisdictions involving collateral conse-
quences of arrests and convictions). 
 94. Collateral Consequences Inventory, Nat’l Inventory of Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/?jurisdiction=&consequence 
_category=&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&consequence_type=&durati
on_category=&page_number=1 [https://perma.cc/TVM2-QZDD] (last visited July 28, 
2021); see also Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121 
Stat. 2534, 2543 (2008) (capturing the collateral consequences of criminal convictions for 
criminal offenses in the United States, each of the states and territories, and the District of 
Columbia). The ABA database was compiled through a grant awarded by the National 
Institute of Justice, an organization that is required by federal statute to gather the data. 
 95. See, e.g., Md. Code Regs. 10.09.53.03D(10) (2021) (prohibiting individuals con-
victed of felonies involving moral turpitude or theft, or with any other criminal history that 
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teachers, bus drivers,96 social workers,97 and other professionals. Categori-
cal prohibitions against persons convicted of “felonies” or “crimes of 
moral turpitude” exclude millions of individuals from employment in a 
host of other career fields.98 With the proliferation of publicly and com-
mercially available criminal records on the internet, applicants’ abilities to 
shield their records or to put them in context for a potential employer 
have diminished.99 
States have drastically different laws regarding the restrictions placed 
on individuals with criminal records.100 For example, twenty-one states ban 
incarcerated individuals convicted of felonies from voting until they com-
plete their sentences.101 Eleven states disenfranchise individuals with cer-
tain felony convictions indefinitely, unless they are pardoned, or impose 
waiting periods after the completion of their sentences.102 
By contrast, several states and the federal government have adopted 
reforms to ease the obstacles presented by criminal records. “Ban-the-box” 
laws require employers to “consider a job candidate’s qualifications first—
without the stigma of a conviction or arrest record.”103 As of October 2020, 
                                                                                                                                
indicates a risk of harm to patients, from serving as private nurses to individuals younger 
than twenty-one). 
 96. See, e.g., id. 13A.06.07.07C(1)(a) (prohibiting drivers convicted or charged with 
crimes of violence or offenses related to driving or minors from operating school vehicles). 
 97. Ohio Admin. Code 4757-11-01(C)(7) (2021) (making the commission of “a felony 
or any crime involving moral turpitude” grounds for revoking a license). 
 98. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 239–41. 
Although there are no general bars to federal employment for people with criminal convic-
tions, there are specific exclusionary rules for certain career fields, such as federal law 
enforcement, enlistment in the military, and some national service programs such as 
AmeriCorps and VISTA. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 2:9. Addi-
tionally, persons convicted of sex crimes, drug-related felonies, or offenses involving child-
victims may not be employed as childcare providers for federal employees. Id. 
 99. See Collateral Damage, supra note 86, at 22. 
 100. See Wayne A. Logan, “When Mercy Seasons Justice”: Interstate Recognition of Ex-
Offender Rights, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 15–16 (2015) (noting that relief provided to ex-
offenders in one state is not necessarily recognized in other states). 
 101. Sarale Sewell & Elizabeth Paukstis, U.S. Comm’n on C.R., Collateral 
Consequences: The Crossroads of Punishment, Redemption, and the Effects on 
Communities 29 (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANN8-T23R]. In some of these states, individuals convicted of felo-
nies lose their right to vote for a period of time after they are released from incarceration, 
while they are on parole or probation. Id.; see also Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Felon 
Voting Rights (June 28, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/ 
felon-voting-rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/8K9U-XT8L]. 
 102. Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, supra note 101. 
 103. Beth Avery & Han Lu, Nat’l Empl. L. Project, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, 
and States Adopt Fair-Chance Policies to Advance Employment Opportunities for People 
With Past Convictions 2 (2020), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-
Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-Oct-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T6Y-EWEA]; see 
also Jessica S. Henry, Closing the Legal Services Gap in Prisoner Reentry Programs, 21 Crim. 
Just. Stud. 15, 22–23 (2008) (describing how legal aid organizations can play a role in help-
ing those with criminal records reintegrate into society). Those laws may, however, prompt 
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thirty-six states and 150 cities and counties have adopted various forms of 
ban-the-box laws.104 Many jurisdictions have gone beyond ban-the-box by 
adopting laws that delay criminal record-related inquiries until after the 
first interview or a conditional job offer.105 For example, despite its long 
history of imposing collateral consequences, Georgia has adopted signifi-
cant reforms that have eased reentry burdens for its residents.106 Until 
2015, employers in Georgia’s public and private sectors could lawfully deny 
employment to applicants with criminal records, including records of ar-
rests not leading to convictions.107 Through an executive order, then-
Governor Nathan Deal eliminated questions about criminal records from 
state employment applications and signed into law a bill that prohibited 
                                                                                                                                
some employers to discriminate against Black applicants instead. Amanda Agan & Sonja 
Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment 1 
(Univ. of Mich. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 16-012, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2795795 [https://perma.cc/UP8S-FUFX] (“Our results confirm that criminal records are 
a major barrier to employment, but they also support the concern that [ban-the-box] poli-
cies encourage statistical discrimination on the basis of race.”). 
 104. Avery & Lu, supra note 103, at 2. 
 105. Id. at 3; 50 State Comparison: Limits on Use of Criminal Record in Employment, 
Licensing & Housing, Restoration of Rts. Project, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-
restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisoncomparison-of-criminal-records-in-licensing-and-
employment/ [https://perma.cc/QE9S-56ZV] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021); see also, e.g., 
California Fair Chance Act, ch. 789, 3 Cal. Stat. 5976 (2017); New York City Fair Chance Act, 
Int. No. 318-A (2015). 
 106. H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Patrick C. DiCarlo, Collateral Consequences of Arrests 
and Convictions: Policy and Law in Georgia 26 (2008), https://www.gjp.org/wp-
content/uploads/Collateral1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2TK-5CXV]. 
 107. See id. at 7 (describing the lack of discrimination protection in Georgia as of 
2008). In 1971, then-Governor Jimmy Carter created the Georgia Crime Information Center 
(GCIC). While the primary purpose of the database was to serve law enforcement officers, 
Georgia and many other states have used these databases to conduct background checks for 
purposes other than law enforcement. Background checks have become one of the most 
significant barriers for individuals with criminal records. See Mary Madden, Michele 
Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of 
Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 53, 66 (2017). Many agencies have 
policies refusing to hire persons with criminal records when the position requires a security 
clearance. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 2:9; Chin, Collateral 
Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 241. In 2015, President Obama imple-
mented a series of reentry policies aimed at protecting former inmates from employment 
and housing discrimination by eliminating rules requiring disclosure of criminal records. A 
related problem involves employers’ use of background checks in facially neutral but factu-
ally discriminatory hiring practices. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (finding that requiring applicants to disclose arrest records had a disproportion-
ate impact on Black people, in violation of Title VII). Title VII prohibits employment prac-
tices that adversely affect individuals because of their race, color, religion, sex (including 
sexual orientation), or national origin. An adverse effect may be shown by establishing that 
a particular hiring practice has a disparate impact on members of a protected class. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2018). Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to show 
that the practice relates to the job and meets the business necessity exception. See id. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
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the refusal or revocation of professional licenses based on felony convic-
tions, unless the felony “directly relates” to the occupation for which the 
license is sought or held.108 Georgia also retreated from mandatory public 
housing policies that excluded persons with criminal records, opting instead 
for policies giving housing authorities discretion to admit applicants with 
criminal records or retain tenants who commit crimes during tenancy.109 
Unfortunately, new administrations can rescind or amend orders of 
previous administrations, and they often reverse course on policies involving 
collateral consequences of involvement with the criminal legal system.110 After 
Governor Deal’s overhaul of discriminatory employment and housing laws, 
newly elected Governor Brian Kemp unveiled plans to ratchet up penalties 
for “street gangs” and sex traffickers, and he proposed a budget that would 
cut funding for the public defender system and problem-solving courts.111 
The constant churn of legislation makes it difficult to catalog regulations gov-
erning collateral consequences and inhibits the implementation of effective 
long-term strategies to identify and call attention to their use. 
Collateral consequences prove insidious for several reasons. First, they 
disproportionately affect Black and brown communities.112 The mass ar-
rest, conviction, and incarceration of people of color has been primarily 
responsible for these disproportionate effects.113 Second, their expansion 
across federal, state, and local jurisdictions has made collateral conse-
quences not only ubiquitous but also hidden.114 The patchwork of discrim-
inatory regulations makes collateral consequences less transparent and 
                                                                                                                                
 108. Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1-19(q)(1) (2017); see also Bonita Ann Huggins, Note, Give 
It To Me, I’m Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia’s Record Restriction Statute to Provide 
Ex-Offenders With A Second Chance in the Employment Sector, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267, 281–83 
(2017) (“The [ban-the-box] solution, however, merely pushes the problem further down 
the hiring timeline rather than eliminating it . . . . Introducing the criminal record to em-
ployers at a later stage of the hiring process essentially makes the employer’s final decision 
of which qualified applicant to hire.”). 
 109. Dennard & DiCarlo, supra note 106, at 72. Georgia residents with criminal records 
are still subject to federal lifetime bans on receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) benefits. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2018). 
 110. See, e.g., Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2016.06, 43-12 Md. Reg. 663 (June 10, 2016). 
 111. Greg Bluestein & Maya T. Prabhu, Kemp Pursues a New Criminal Justice Policy, 
Unnerving Critics, Atlanta J.-Const. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.ajc.com/news/state–
regional-govt–politics/kemp-pursues-new-criminal-justice-policy-unnerving-critics/kjbvlg 
LsPWnDE2RrWROM5L/ [https://perma.cc/ZM4Z-QP7E]. Governor Kemp also unveiled 
plans to more closely track immigrants with criminal records. Id. 
 112. Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, at 516–17. 
 113. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness 179 (2020) (discussing the impact of collateral consequences on African 
Americans “churn[ed] . . . in and out of prisons today”); Pinard, Criminal Records, supra 
note 84, at 971 (noting that mass incarceration and conviction are separate issues and have 
distinct collateral consequences). 
 114. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247–48 
(“[L]aws governing convicted persons are scattered throughout codes and regulations, and 
individuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to comb the laws . . . .”). 
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more resistant to public scrutiny than clearly defined bodies of law, such 
as criminal statutes.115 Third, many courts do not recognize collateral con-
sequences as punishment for constitutional purposes.116 As a practical mat-
ter, they may be the most significant aspect of punishment. Criminal 
defendants are, however, generally not informed about the collateral ef-
fects of their pleas.117 Less than 10% of criminal cases reach the trial stage, 
meaning that millions of Americans take plea deals without understanding 
the impact the convictions will have on the rest of their lives.118 The next 
section discusses the diverse and complex strategies adopted by different 
jurisdictions to remedy the problem of collateral consequences.119 
2. Redeeming Persons Involved in the Criminal Legal System. — The ap-
proaches to restoring rights for individuals with criminal records vary 
widely across federal, state, and local jurisdictions.120 Approaches to miti-
gating collateral consequences involve either “forgiving” past crimes 
through executive pardon or judicial dispensation, or “forgetting” them 
by restricting access to records through record sealing, expungement, va-
catur, or other methods.121 Generally, scholars and law reform advocates 
                                                                                                                                
 115. See id. at 253 (describing how the “piecemeal” development of collateral conse-
quences has shielded legislatures from the need to justify their decisions). 
 116. See id. at 243 (“Many courts have held that collateral consequences are not punish-
ment and are thus not covered by the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments or the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy.” (citation omitted)). 
 117. See id. at 248 (“[I]ndividuals charged with crimes generally cannot hire lawyers to 
comb the laws and produce a compendium containing all relevant [collateral consequences].”). 
But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires counsel to inform her client when a guilty plea may result in deportation). 
 118. See Emily Yoffe, Innocence is Irrelevant, Atlantic (Sept. 2017), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result of plea 
bargains—some 94 percent at the state level, and some 97 percent at the federal level. Esti-
mates for misdemeanor convictions run even higher.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love & Susan M. Kuzma, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of 
the Pardon Att’y, Civil Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-by-State Survey 1 (1996), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2LY-BU9J] (referring 
to the varying state mechanisms to address collateral consequences as “something of a na-
tional crazy-quilt”). 
 120. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 7:1 (“Like collateral conse-
quences themselves, widely varying state restoration mechanisms result in ‘something of a 
national crazy-quilt.’” (quoting Kuzma & Love, supra note 119, at 1). 
 121. See Margaret Love, Josh Gaines & Jenny Osborne, Collateral Consequences Res. 
Ctr., Forgiving and Forgetting in American Justice: A 50-State Guide to Expungement and 
Restoration of Rights 2 (2018), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ 
Forgiving-Forgetting-CCRC-Aug-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX4Z-CTGK] [hereinafter Love 
et al., Forgiving and Forgetting] (“[P]olicy-makers are again debating whether it is more 
effective to forgive a person’s past crimes (through executive pardon or judicial dispensa-
tion) or to forget them (through record-sealing or expungement).”). Expungement techni-
cally means to “obliterate” the record, whereas record sealing is a mechanism to limit access 
to records. Vacatur is an order to set aside a judgment or annul a proceeding. These mech-
anisms may have broader or narrower practical effects, depending on the jurisdiction in 
which they are employed. See Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, §§ 5:1, 5:5. 
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prefer forgiveness because this, theoretically, restores individuals to their 
original legal position before the conviction occurred.122 Forgiveness 
mechanisms take different forms depending on the jurisdiction but gen-
erally include executive pardons, judicial set-asides, legislative durational 
limits, and administrative waiver provisions.123 Proponents of forgiveness 
argue that convictions should have an end-point, and that one of the goals 
of the criminal legal system should be that individuals graduate from it.124 
Record sealing and expungement mechanisms, on the other hand, 
do not affect the disabilities related to convictions but rather shield or re-
move the records, thus reducing the informal consequences and stigma 
stemming from criminal databases.125 Even though reform advocates gen-
erally favor these mechanisms, some argue that they are too costly and in-
effective in both moral and legal terms.126 The legal costs relate to their 
sporadic effectiveness. Variances among states as to when records are 
sealed or expunged, who retains access to them, and the possibility that 
records were disseminated and saved on private servers prior to sealing or 
expungement all undermine the goals of these tools.127 Those who oppose 
expungement and sealing on moral grounds either believe that the mech-
anisms absolve society of its obligation to address institutional racism and 
subvert open and transparent discussion of the issues or believe that ex-
pungement creates a “right to lie.”128 Nonetheless, these mechanisms offer 
                                                                                                                                
 122. See, e.g., Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 7:1 (discussing 
how these programs may have a restorative impact). Pardons relieve individuals of all legal 
disabilities and penalties, but do not negate the predicate effect of the conviction or prohibit 
its use in subsequent criminal proceedings. See id. § 7:7. 
 123. Id. § 7:2. 
 124. See, e.g., id. § 7:1 n.11 (“More than forty years ago, two veteran probation officers 
remarked on this phenomenon: ‘We solemnize the offender’s induction into the system. 
When he successfully concludes the program, though, we fail to institutionalize his depar-
ture correspondingly. It’s fun to catch the fish but hard to let him go.’” (quoting Bernard 
Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big 
Lie, 61 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 378, 390 (1970))). 
 125. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expungement of record” as “[t]he removal of a 
conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal record.” Expungement of 
Record, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
 126. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 20, at 113 (providing an overview of expungement 
and alternatives such as sealing and certificates of rehabilitation); Marc A. Franklin & Diane 
Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 
Hofstra L. Rev. 733, 735 (1981); Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery, Jr., Sealing and 
Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 
378, 391 (1970) (“It is a profound mistake to mix in with redemptive legislation any provi-
sion for concealing the records.”). 
 127. See Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 126, at 747; Madden et al., supra note 107, at 
77 (stating that data is being scraped from publicly available websites and stored for perpe-
tuity); Sarah Esther Lageson, There’s No Such Thing as Expunging a Criminal Record 
Anymore, Slate (Jan. 7, 2019), https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/criminal-record-
expungement-internet-due-process.html [https://perma.cc/5T8N-QQCS]. 
 128. See Jacobs, supra note 20, at 123 (cleaned up) (arguing that expungement au-
thorizes beneficiaries to falsely deny arrests and convictions and prohibits employers from 
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individuals a relatively accessible and practical solution to address the col-
lateral consequences of their criminal records and provide some relief to 
those who suffer from the consequences of institutional racism. 
Beginning in the 2000s, interest in collateral consequences experi-
enced a rebirth.129 Between 2004 and 2017, the ABA, Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC), and American Law Institute (ALI) issued a panoply 
of proposed reforms for the states and federal government to consider.130 
Providentially, their approaches shared a few broad principles. First, they 
proposed that collateral consequences be identified and catalogued so 
that individuals charged with crimes can assess the impact of their pleas.131 
                                                                                                                                
asking about them); Kogon & Loughery, supra note 126, at 391 (arguing that expungement 
protects society from confronting its aberrant attitudes). 
 129. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 1:6. In 2004, President 
George W. Bush referenced “second chance[s]” and “a better life” for individuals with crim-
inal records in his State of the Union Address. Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the 
Union Address, Wash. Post (Jan. 20, 2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ 
politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In 2010, 
the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
that defendants be advised of deportation consequences of their pleas. See 559 U.S. 356, 
373–74 (2010) (finding that Sixth Amendment precedent and the severity of deportation 
require counsel to inform defendants of the risk of their deportation during the plea-bar-
gaining process). In 2011, the Department of Justice redoubled their efforts to collect data 
on collateral consequences in every U.S. jurisdiction; in 2012, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidance on collateral consequences of 
employment. See Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction 
Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, U.S. Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-cons 
ideration-arrest-and-conviction-records-employment-decisions [https://perma.cc/JZY6-V3WK] 
(last visited July 27, 2021). In 2014, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
issued an extensive report urging states to address the issue. See generally Collateral 
Damage, supra note 86 (reporting on the legal and social barriers that a person faces after 
a court-imposed criminal sentence). 
 130. Love et al., Collateral Consequences, supra note 20, § 9:2. In 2008, Congress 
passed the Second Chance Act, a law that supported various reentry programs for incarcer-
ated individuals. See Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 60501 
(2018)) (helping formerly incarcerated individuals circumvent collateral consequences to 
obtain services but not directly reforming collateral consequence laws); see also Margaret 
Colgate Love, Starting Over With a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model 
Penal Code, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1705, 1708–17, 1723–25 (2003) (detailing various efforts 
to reform collateral penalties); Ronald D’Amico, Christian Geckeler & Hui Kim, Nat’l Crim. 
Just. Reference Serv., An Evaluation of Seven Second Chance Act Adult Demonstration 
Programs: Impact Findings at 18 Months, at xi–xii (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/251139.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7R8-8XVK]; Pamela K. Lattimore & Christy A. 
Visher, Nat’l Crim. Just. Reference Serv., The Multi-Site Evaluation of SVORI: Summary and 
Synthesis, at vi–vii (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230421.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/9XPZ-GBR5]. 
 131. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247 (2018); 
see also National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Nat’l Inst. of Just. 
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/national-inventory-collateral-consequences- 
conviction [https://perma.cc/A5BA-X3ET]. In 2007, Congress passed the Court Security 
Improvement Act that directed the Director of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to 
create a compendium of collateral consequences in the United States. In concert with the 
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Second, they urged the consideration of collateral consequences in crimi-
nal prosecutions.132 For example, they proposed that collateral conse-
quences be considered in sentencing, recognizing the broad authority of 
courts to hear mitigating evidence.133 Third, they warned that jurisdictions 
must carefully consider whether new or existing collateral consequences 
actually promote public safety. They recommended an evidence-based ap-
proach to considering the link between consequences and risk reduction 
laws, rather than relying on perceived assumptions. Finally, they suggested 
specific relief mechanisms for adoption by states and the federal govern-
ment.134 These mechanisms of relief ranged from consequences in indi-
vidual cases to broader automatic relief mechanisms based on the 
completion of sentences and the passage of time.135 
Modern trends favor a combination of judicial and legislative action 
to address collateral consequences.136 Some jurisdictions have experi-
mented with court-issued “Certificates of Restoration of Rights” that re-
lieve all remaining collateral consequences and affirm the full 
rehabilitation and good character of individuals with criminal records.137 
Based on legislatively determined standards that authorize brief waiting 
periods for review and no categorical exclusions, courts review individual 
cases, at sentencing or thereafter, to help society assess the risk of 
extending benefits to justice-involved individuals. Additionally, many 
                                                                                                                                
ABA, the NIJ created an online publicly available database. See Court Security Improvement 
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177, § 510, 121 Stat. 2534 (2008) (“The Director of the National 
Institute of Justice . . . shall conduct a study to determine and compile the collateral conse-
quences of convictions for criminal offenses in the United States.”). 
 132. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 249. In 
Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court noted that both prosecutors and defendants can lev-
erage the bargaining power of collateral consequences in charging and plea-bargaining ne-
gotiations. Both the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the ALI’s 2017 Model Penal 
Code incorporated the Supreme Court’s dicta into their standards and identified stages in 
criminal prosecutions that allow for the consideration of collateral consequences. See 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373 (noting that collateral consequences can play a crucial role in plea-
bargaining negotiations). 
 133. Collateral Sanctions, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/ 
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_collateral_blk/#2.4/ 
[https://perma.cc/77ZE-RVHH] (last visited July 27, 2021); see also United States v. 
Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (doling out a one-year probation in consider-
ation of the collateral consequences the defendant would face); Uniform Collateral 
Consequences Conviction Act (Unif. L. Comm’n 2010); Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
§ 6x.02(2), 6x.04 (Am. L. Inst. 2017). 
 134. Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 247. 
 135. See id. at 252 (noting that the ABA, Model Penal Code, and Uniform Collateral 
Consequences Act of 2009 all contemplate that rehabilitation may be indicated by the pas-
sage of time, completion of a sentence, and criminal history). 
 136. See Margaret Colgate Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Forgoing: Legislative 
Experiments in Restoring Rights and Status, 30 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 231, 232 (2018) [hereinaf-
ter Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Foregoing] (noting that an effective strategy for dealing 
with collateral consequences requires a more nuanced and practical approach). 
 137. Id. 
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courts facilitate the deferral or dismissal of criminal cases through 
problem-solving courts or other programs that steer defendants away from 
convictions.138 Most jurisdictions still favor expungements and sealing 
laws, though legislatures have generally been hesitant to expand relief 
beyond low-level offenses and crimes not resulting in convictions.139 
However, a few jurisdictions have adopted progressive expungement 
provisions that come close to automatic concealment for minor 
offenses.140 For example, California’s Health and Safety Code calls for the 
immediate destruction of records involving misdemeanor marijuana 
possession arrests for which there were no convictions and the destruction 
of records within two years for cases with convictions.141 Petitioners must 
still file a court petition to ensure the destruction of agency records.142 
Two states in particular exemplify new approaches to collateral con-
sequences reform. In 2019, New Jersey created a “clean slate” expunge-
ment system that eased access for petitioners and authorized the 
expungement of all offenses after ten years, with exceptions for the most 
serious violent offenses.143 It also began a process for automating expunge-
ments rather than requiring individual petitions to the courts.144 In 2018, 
Indiana developed a systemic approach to collateral consequences reform 
by enacting extensive licensing and employment law aimed at stemming 
collateral consequences.145 The law requires licensing boards to list all dis-
qualifying crimes for licensure, and to include only those crimes that di-
rectly relate to the duties of the occupation or profession.146 The law also 
                                                                                                                                
 138. See Kristine A. Huskey, Justice for Veterans: Does Theory Matter?, 59 Ariz. L. Rev. 
697, 705 (2017) (noting that veterans treatment courts divert participants from the conven-
tional criminal legal system to specialized dockets where compliance with treatment, rather 
than incarceration, drives resolution of the case). 
 139. See Love, Forgiving, Forgetting, and Foregoing, supra note 136, at 232 (explain-
ing that judicial relief has rarely reached beyond minor offenses). 
 140. See id. at 235 (noting that Indiana automatically purges records after a certain 
period of time). 
 141. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11361.5 (2019); see also Gerald F. Uelmen, 
California’s New Marijuana Law: A Sailing Guide for Uncharted Waters, 51 Cal. St. Bar J. 27, 
75–76 (1976) (offering an early perspective on California’s progressive drug laws, including 
its expungement law, and identifying potential issues for litigation). 
 142. See, e.g., Steve Escovar, Post-Conviction Relief! Health and Safety Code Section 
11357(c) Controlled Substance Offense Record of Arrest and Conviction Destroyed 
Pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 11361.5!, Escovar L., APC (May 22, 2019), https: 
//www.escovarlaw.com/blog/2019/may/post-conviction-relief-health-and-safety-code-se2/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PPV-PV7J] (noting that the petitioner had to obtain a court order to 
ensure the destruction of records). 
 143. S. 4154, 218th Leg., 2nd Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 144. Id. 
 145. H. 1245, 120th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018). 
 146. Indiana Restoration of Rights and Record Relief, Restoration of Rts. Project, 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/indiana-restoration-of-rights-pardon- 
expungement-sealing/#IV_Criminal_record_in_employment_licensing/ [https://perma.cc 
/Q3P9-4LKR] (last updated May 25, 2021). 
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forbids the use of vague terms such as “crimes of moral turpitude” or 
“good character” in licensing determinations, and it forbids consideration 
of arrests not resulting in convictions.147 The disqualifying period for listed 
convictions was capped at five years, with consideration for individual pe-
titions at any time.148 
Recent studies have shown that mechanisms aimed at reducing the col-
lateral consequences of arrests and convictions are indeed effective.149 One 
study examined the effect of judicially issued “certificates of relief” on hiring 
practices in Ohio. The certificates lifted occupational licensing restrictions, 
limited employer liability for negligent hiring claims, and demonstrated to 
employers that the certificate holder had been rehabilitated.150 Researchers 
found that certificate holders were three times as likely to receive interviews 
as applicants with records but without certificates, and equally as likely to 
receive interviews as applicants with clean records.151 Another study exam-
ined employment and earning statistics of individuals who had received rec-
ord clearing interventions at the East Bay Community Law Center’s Clean 
Slate Clinic in California.152 The clinic offered post-conviction set-aside and 
dismissal interventions for individuals with convictions that did not result in 
prison sentences, as well as felony reduction interventions.153 The study 
found that clearing interventions increased employment rates for clinic cli-
ents by as much as 85% and boosted average earnings by as much as 
$6,000.154 More data is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of other rec-
ord clearing remedies, such as certificates of rehabilitation, expungements, 
vacatur, and record sealing, but these studies hold promising results. 
B. Discharges: Collateral Consequences and the Failure of Discharge Review 
1. Collateral Consequences of Military Discharges. — Although the mili-
tary does not classify administrative discharges as punitive, they have for-
mal and informal consequences much like those imposed on individuals 
                                                                                                                                
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Chin, Collateral Consequences and Criminal Justice, supra note 81, at 253 
(“Because of the limited judicial review, legislatures have not had to articulate the reasons 
for their enactment [of collateral consequence laws] or evaluate their effectiveness or 
costs.”). 
 150. Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief 
as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y 
Rev. Inter Alia 11, 14 (2016). 
 151. Id. at 19. 
 152. Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Record 
Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 29 (2018). 
 153. Id. at 33. Under California law, individuals convicted of certain infractions, misde-
meanors, and felonies not resulting in a prison sentence can petition the court to set aside 
and dismiss their convictions. Cal. Penal Code §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 1203.41 (2020). Individ-
uals convicted of felonies that do not result in prison sentences may petition the court to 
have their felonies reduced to misdemeanors. Id. § 17(b). 
 154. Selbin et al., supra note 152, at 8. 
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with criminal records.155 Many of the formal consequences of LTH dis-
charges involve prohibitions on receiving veterans’ benefits. Veterans who 
are most in need of VA benefits, including healthcare, housing, employ-
ment, and disability benefits, are generally not eligible to receive them.156 
Informally, veterans with LTH discharges face discriminatory practices 
when seeking employment and housing, much like the discrimination ex-
perienced by individuals with criminal records.157 Veterans must also en-
dure the unique psychological impact of discharge characterizations, 
which has its own debilitating effects.158 Despite the technical differences 
between discharges and criminal prosecutions, the collateral effects re-
main predictably the same. Veterans marked with denigrating labels, often 
for life, have a reduced chance for successful reentry or reintegration into 
civilian society.159 
a. Loss of Military Benefits and Career. — Collateral consequences ex-
perienced by people involved with the criminal legal system parallel the 
collateral consequences for servicemembers with LTH discharges in signif-
icant ways. In both cases, collateral consequences are serious and immedi-
ate. Incarcerated persons may lose their jobs, homes, access to routine 
medical and dental care, and basic civil rights, including the right to vote 
and the right to be secure in their personal effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.160 Convictions may extend the abdication of civil 
rights beyond any period of confinement.161 
For servicemembers, the immediate effects include the loss of military 
employment, salary, medical, dental, clothing, commissary, and housing 
                                                                                                                                
 155. See Bednar, supra note 37, at 2 (finding that the impact of a dishonorable dis-
charge goes far beyond a loss of important benefits and rights for the concerned party); 
Jones, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that “any less than honorable discharge may substantially 
hinder the post-service life of its recipient”). 
 156. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 11 (“In other words, 
85% of veterans with bad-paper discharges who applied for some VA benefit have been told 
that their service was so ‘[d]ishonorable’ that they forfeited all rights to almost every federal 
veteran benefits.”). 
 157. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 12–13. There is a perception that an offender 
whose conduct required a dishonorable discharge designation “deserves” to have a hard 
transition back to civilian life. The brand of “bad paper[s]” has been characterized as a “life 
sentence” or “a ticket to America’s underclass [and] a bar to leaving it.” Id. at 12. 
 158. See Scapardine, supra note 48, at 1135–36 (2017) (finding that an OTH discharge 
carries with it a negative stigma that “greatly limits the opportunities for both public and 
private civilian employment”). 
 159. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 21 (“The high rates of 
ineligibility have grave consequences for the veterans denied access to the VA, as well as to 
society as a whole.”). 
 160. See Bernice B. Donald & Devon C. Muse, Lifelong Collateral Consequences: The 
Modern-Day Scarlet Letter, 68 Drake L. Rev. 707, 708 (2020) (explaining that collateral con-
sequences compound societal issues of social inequity, poverty, and poor health and prevent 
individuals who have been previously incarcerated to move forward, even after “paying their 
debts” to society). 
 161. See id. 
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benefits, as well as access to all family support services.162 For military mem-
bers serving away from their state of legal residence, a frequent occurrence 
for servicemembers, a discharge also means relocating and establishing 
residency in another state or country.163 Skills acquired during service may 
not be transferable to the private sector.164 Therefore, a discharge often 
means the end of a career for many servicemembers.165 The termination 
of benefits and career opportunities are catastrophic for many service-
members, especially those suffering from mental health issues.166 
b. Loss of VA Benefits. — The lingering effects of criminal arrests and 
convictions also parallel the long-term consequences of an LTH discharge. 
In the mid-90s, federal and state welfare reform resulted in the enactment 
of legislation that imposed lifetime bans on public benefits for individuals 
convicted of drug-related offenses.167 In the last decade, many states have 
opted out of those bans.168 Nonetheless, some states still impose bans or 
make the receipt of benefits conditional on drug tests and enrollment in 
treatment programs.169 
                                                                                                                                
 162. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 21–22 (giving an over-
view of the impact that an OTH discharge can have on a veteran, including increased risk 
of mental health conditions and suicide, of becoming involved in the criminal justice system, 
and of homelessness). 
 163. See id. at 22 (“The VA’s restrictive implementation of the Other Than 
Dishonorable eligibility standard leaves most veterans with bad paper discharges unable to 
access crucial support that could help them find stable and secure housing.”) 
 164. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Veterans are Working, but Not in Jobs That Match Their 
Advanced Training, N.Y. Times (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/us/ 
politics/veterans-jobs-employment.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last up-
dated Mar. 16, 2020) (indicating that underemployment is one of the biggest issues faced 
by veterans returning from combat). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1377 (describing how after a finding of military mis-
conduct, many individuals are pushed out of service with OTH discharges, which results in 
no or reduced benefits, poor job prospects, and societal stigma). 
 167. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. § 862a (1996); Crystal S. Yang, Does Public Assistance Reduce Recidivism?, 
107 Am. Econ. Rev. 551, 551 (2017). 
 168. Chesterfield Polkey, Most States Have Ended SNAP Ban for Convicted Drug 
Felons, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislators: NCSL Blog (July 30, 2019), https://www.ncsl. 
org/blog/2019/07/30/most-states-have-ended-snap-ban-for-convicted-drug-felons.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/XHM4-A8YS]; see also Yang, supra note 167, at 554 (concluding that 
felons who are provided access to public benefits are less likely to return to prison within a 
year). 
 169. See, e.g., Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, Nat’l Conf. 
of State Legislatures (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-
testing-and-public-assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/TAV9-4H4Y] (listing Alabama, 
Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as the states which 
have passed legislation regarding drug testing or screening for public assistance 
applicants or recipients). 
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Veterans with OTH discharges are also banned from receiving bene-
fits.170 VA bars most veterans with OTH discharges from accessing the mili-
tary’s safety net of benefits that was designed to assist veterans transitioning 
out of the military.171 In 1944, in part to aid struggling World War II veterans 
returning from service, Congress enacted the G.I. Bill of Rights, the largest 
expansion of military benefits in U.S. history.172 The bill provided a myriad 
of benefits, including education, housing, healthcare, disability compensa-
tion, vocational rehabilitation, burial, pension, retirement, and other bene-
fits and services for veterans.173 
Importantly, Congress made the benefits available to all servicemem-
bers discharged “under other than dishonorable conditions.”174 In provi-
sions known as the “statutory bars,” Congress enumerated the dishonorable 
conditions under which servicemembers were not eligible to receive bene-
fits.175 The conditions included severe misconduct, such as desertion for 
more than 180 days, and discharges ordered pursuant to a general court-
martial.176 VA added its own exclusions, under congressional authority, that 
                                                                                                                                
 170. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 50 (explaining that “a veteran with an OTH” 
discharge due to a 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) violation is barred from “eligibility for any VA health 
care benefits”). 
 171. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40. VA implemented its regulatory bars after 
World War II. Prior to World War II, Congress set eligibility requirements that were specific 
to each military conflict. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 82, 85. For example, 
veterans of the Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and Boxer Rebellion were 
required to have an honorable discharge for disability pensions. Veterans with bad conduct 
or dishonorable discharges were barred from receiving many benefits, including medical 
and burial benefits. Id at 82. 
 172. Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284. Congress 
passed the bill to help servicemembers who were drafted and removed from their civilian 
jobs. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 73–74 (reviewing the history of the G.I. Bill). 
But see Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial 
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America 114 (2005) (noting that Black servicemembers re-
ceived considerably fewer G.I. Bill benefits than white servicemembers). 
 173. 58 Stat. 284. 
 174. See Hearings on H.R. 3917 and S. 1767 to Provide Federal Government Aid for 
the Readjustment in Civilian Life of Returning World War II Veterans Before the H. Comm. 
on World War Veterans’ Legis., 78th Cong. 415 (1944) [hereinafter House Hearings on G.I. 
Bill] (statement of Harry W. Colmery, past commander, the American Legion). The legisla-
tive history of the bill makes clear that Congress did not want benefits distributed only to 
those with an honorable discharge because, as one past commander stated, “[W]e are seek-
ing to protect the veteran against injustice . . . . [W]e are trying to give the veteran the ben-
efit of the doubt, for we think he is entitled to it.” Id. 
 175. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) (2018). 
 176. Id. The statute specifies bars to benefits for servicemembers who were discharged 
under certain conditions: by sentence of a general court-martial; for conscientious objec-
tion, when the servicemember refused to perform military duty or wear the uniform or oth-
erwise comply with lawful orders of a competent military authority; for desertion; for 
absence without authority from active duty for a continuous period of at least 180 days if the 
servicemember was discharged under conditions other than honorable; by seeking dis-
charge as an alien during a period of hostilities; and for resignation by an officer for the 
good of the service. 
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made thousands more veterans ineligible for benefits, including most vet-
erans with OTH discharges.177 These “regulatory bars” include broader 
exclusions for “willful and persistent misconduct,” offenses involving 
“moral turpitude,” and other minor offenses for which servicemembers 
were administratively discharged rather than court-martialed.178 The ill-
defined terms provide VA with the discretion to exclude additional veter-
ans whose circumstances fall outside of the limited statutory categories de-
fined by Congress.179 
VA denies an extensive number of benefits to most veterans with OTH 
discharges.180 Veterans with honorable and general (under honorable con-
ditions) discharges receive government-backed home loans, subsidized 
housing vouchers, small-business loans, burial benefits, pensions, 
disability compensation, comprehensive healthcare, case management 
services, rehabilitation services, residential care, compensated work 
therapy, employment training, tuition assistance, and telecounseling 
services, among other benefits.181 Only veterans with honorable 
discharges receive benefits under the Montgomery or Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, 
which provided educational assistance to servicemembers and veterans.182 
While these benefits help veterans with honorable and general discharges, 
                                                                                                                                
 177. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (2020); Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 106 (“[E]xclu-
sions based on the “other than dishonorable conditions” element have become known as 
the “regulatory bars,” referring to the VA regulations that elaborate the term.”). 
 178. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). 
 179. In Camarena v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 565, 567 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 60 F.3d 843 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit addressed 
whether VA overstepped its statutory authority in excluding veterans with bad conduct dis-
charges from receiving VA benefits. The Court found that the phrase “dishonorable condi-
tions” gave VA discretion to exclude veterans with other than fully dishonorable discharges, 
but stated that Congress clearly intended to exclude only those veterans who committed 
misconduct equivalent to the dishonorable standard. See Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, 
at 103. 
 180. See VA Benefits for Servicemembers, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 
https://www.va.gov/service-member-benefits/#va-benefits-you-can-use-during-and-after-service 
[https://perma.cc/33HG-EHAA] (last updated July 29, 2021) (providing information on 
various benefits for servicemembers). VA distinguishes between veterans with honorable, 
general, and OTH discharges when distributing VA benefits. Veterans with honorable and 
general discharges are eligible to receive most VA benefits, except for educational benefits, 
which VA only grants to honorably discharged veterans. Servicemembers whom VA deems 
ineligible to receive benefits may request reconsideration on a case-by-case basis. See 
Applying for Benefits and Your Character of Discharge, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., https:// 
www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/character_of_discharge.asp [https://perma.cc/TZ8K-BZDY] 
(last updated Dec. 10, 2020) (listing benefits available to veterans with honorable versus 
general discharges). 
 181. See Veterans Benefits Administration Fact Sheets, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 
https://benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/factsheets.asp#BM4/ [https://perma.cc/3L77-LELH] 
(last updated July 26, 2021); see also Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 42–51 (describing the 
various benefits available to veterans and the types of discharges required to receive such 
benefits). 
 182. 38 C.F.R. § 21.9520(a)(2). 
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veterans with OTH discharges have the most difficulty transitioning to 
civilian society and need them the most.183 
c. Ineligibility for VA Healthcare. — Persons with felony convictions 
have notoriously limited access to healthcare.184 Similarly, healthcare is 
one of the most significant VA benefits that is denied to veterans with LTH 
discharges. Generally, veterans with OTH discharges do not qualify for 
healthcare unless they prove that their illness is related to service.185 Even 
then, VA will only treat a veteran’s service-connected disability but will not 
provide general healthcare.186 Yet in response to the mental health dis-
charge crisis reported by the GAO in 2017, VA implemented regulations 
to provide emergency mental health services to any veteran for up to 
ninety days, including inpatient, residential, and outpatient treatment ser-
vices, regardless of their discharge characterization.187 Additionally, 
Congress passed the Honor Our Commitment Act of 2018 that extended 
healthcare to a limited number of veterans with OTH discharges.188 Under 
the Act, veterans who served at least 100 days on active duty and deployed 
in a theater of combat operations or in support of combat operations, or 
who are survivors of military sexual trauma, are eligible for extended men-
tal and behavioral healthcare, regardless of their discharge.189 While these 
efforts are laudable, they are limited in scope and exclude thousands of 
veterans who do not meet the criteria.190 Further, VA often misinterprets 
                                                                                                                                
 183. See Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 7–8 (indicating exclusion 
from the VA due to OTH discharge can mean the denial of a variety of benefits that help in 
the transition back into civilian life, including housing, healthcare, and employment support). 
 184. See Jay Hancock, Out of Jail, Uninsured, Ex-Inmates Face Health Care Challenges, 
Balt. Sun (Apr. 23, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-ex-inmate-health 
care-20160424-story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating that thousands 
of people who were previously incarcerated leave prison with mental illness or chronic 
health issues, but live without access to healthcare). 
 185. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.360(a) (allowing health benefits to be given “to certain former 
service persons with administrative discharges under other than honorable conditions for 
any disability incurred or aggravated during active military, naval, or air service in line of 
duty”). 
 186. Id.; see also Veterans Legal Clinic at the Legal Servs. Ctr. of Harvard L. Sch., 
Veterans Legal Servs., Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP, Turned Away: How VA 
Unlawfully Denies Health Care to Veterans With Bad Paper Discharges 2 (2020) 
https://www.legalservicescenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Turn-Away-Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4BRQ-25J5] (noting that every person seeking VA healthcare is entitled to apply, 
but VA offices often exclude veterans completely from services they could be eligible for on 
the basis of their discharge paperwork). 
 187. See 38 U.S.C. § 1702 (2018); 38 C.F.R. § 17.34. 
 188. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 258, 132 Stat. 348, 
826 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Ledesma, supra note 23, at 191 (commenting that while there is an adminis-
trative process that allows servicemembers who received a “bad paper” discharge to chal-
lenge that characterization in order to seek benefits, the processes are incredibly lengthy 
and difficult to navigate, leaving many servicemembers without healthcare benefits). 
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its own regulations and denies care to qualifying veterans, who tend to lack 
access to legal counsel or knowledge of their legal rights to challenge these 
denials.191 
d. Ineligibility for VA Housing Programs. — Just as criminal background 
checks often disqualify persons with criminal records from obtaining hous-
ing, veterans with OTH discharges have limited housing options.192 VA of-
fers an array of housing and residential treatment programs for its 
veterans, but again, the programs are limited to veterans with honorable 
or general discharges.193 Veterans with OTH discharges represent 25% of 
the total homeless veteran population and account for 5% of all separated 
servicemembers.194 At the end of 2020, under the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development-VA Supportive Housing (HUD-VASH) 
program, HUD and VA provided permanent housing and supportive ser-
vices to 100,570 homeless veterans and their families.195 Since the program 
is based on eligibility for VA healthcare, it excludes most homeless veterans 
with OTH discharges.196 Additionally, many states offer VA-subsidized as-
sisted-living and skilled-nursing facilities for veterans, but only to those 
who were discharged under honorable conditions.197 
e. Exclusion from State and Federal Education and Employment Programs 
for Veterans. — Veterans with “bad paper” who are transitioning into the 
workforce face the same dearth of employment and education opportuni-
                                                                                                                                
 191. See Brennan, supra note 21 (indicating that VA staff members routinely misapply 
the law and misinterpret military records, thus preventing eligible veterans from receiving 
treatment). 
 192. See Fair Housing for People With a Criminal History, Fair Housing Ctr. for Rts. & 
Rsch., https://www.thehousingcenter.org/resources/criminal-history/ [https://perma.cc 
/DC2R-3XNE] (last visited July 27, 2021) (explaining that criminal background checks are 
often used as a screening criterion for rental housing to determine qualified applicants, 
resulting in continued penalty for those with a criminal history even after they leave prison). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Adi V. Gundlapalli, Jamison D. Fargo, Stephen Metraux, Marjorie E. Carter, 
Matthew H. Samore, Vincent Kane & Dennis P. Culhane, Military Misconduct and 
Homelessness Among US Veterans Separated From Active Duty, 2001–2012, 314 JAMA 832, 
832 (2015) (noting also that the “[i]ncidence of homelessness was significantly greater for 
misconduct vs normal separations at first VHA encounter (1.3% vs. 0.2% . . . ), within 1 year 
(5.4% vs. 0.6% . . . ), and 5 years (9.8% vs. 1.4% . . . ) of first VHA encounter”). 
 195. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-VA Supportive Housing 
(HUD-VASH) Program, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., https://www.va.gov/homeless/hud-
vash.asp [https://perma.cc/27RP-7LJQ] (last updated Mar. 30, 2021). 
 196. HUD-VASH Eligibility Criteria, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, https://www.va.gov/ho 
meless/hud-vash_eligibility.asp [https://perma.cc/GZ66-MVPX] (last updated Feb. 19, 2019). 
 197. See, e.g., Admissions Eligibility, Charlotte Hall Veterans Home, https://www.char 
hall.org/content/admissions/eligibility.cfm [https://perma.cc/7UZH-2XR8] (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2021) (noting that in order to be eligible for admission to Charlotte Hall Veterans 
Home, the individual must be “a Maryland veteran who served full time active duty in the 
U.S. Armed Forces, other than active duty for training, and was discharged or released under 
honorable conditions” (emphasis added)). 
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ties as people with criminal convictions upon their reentry into the work-
force.198 While states and federal agencies offer transition programs 
specifically tailored for veterans, these programs also follow VA’s eligibility 
determinations and exclude veterans with LTH discharges. For example, 
under the Illinois Veterans’ Grant program, honorably discharged veter-
ans receive tuition assistance at all Illinois state colleges, universities, and 
community colleges.199 Illinois’ “Troops to Teachers” program assists ser-
vicemembers who are pursuing careers in public school teaching.200 Mili-
tary members who served during wartime or overseas receive a one-time 
“Service Bonus.”201 In Texas, disabled veterans receive tuition waivers at 
in-state colleges and free driver’s licenses.202 These innovative programs 
are tremendously helpful to veterans transitioning from military service, 
but their exclusionary policies limit their effectiveness. 
Veteran employment programs intended to protect veterans and to 
facilitate their transition into the workforce are generally not available to 
veterans with OTH discharges. One of the most comprehensive federal 
employment programs, the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Act (USERRA), was intended to prevent employment dis-
crimination against servicemembers entering or reentering civil employ-
ment after military service.203 For example, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
saw record numbers of Reserve Component servicemembers mobilized for 
federal service, often for multiple tours of duty.204 These servicemembers 
left and returned to civilian jobs multiple times over a period of years.205 
USERRA protects these servicemembers from employment discrimination, 
but not veterans with OTH discharges.206 Section 4304 of the Act excludes 
servicemembers with OTH separations and punitive discharges from its 
protections.207 As such, even a servicemember with multiple enlistments of 
                                                                                                                                
 198. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 13–14 (“[S]tatistics on the connection be-
tween post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and crime leave much to be desired . . . [but] 
enough data now exist[s] to conclude that the military has essentially criminalized mental 
illness . . . .”). 
 199. Illinois Veteran’s Benefits, MilitaryBenefits.info, https://militarybenefits.info/ 
illinois-veterans-benefits [https://perma.cc/5DPG-ZTSC] (last visited July 27, 2021). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
353, sec. 2, § 4301, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150 (1994) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4331 (2018)). 
USERRA added additional protections to an earlier law that provided workplace protections 
for veterans. See S.J. Res. 286, 76th Cong. (1940); Karin, supra note 40, at 137 (explaining 
that the goal of USERRA was to help servicemembers integrate into civilian life after military 
service and foster participation in the workforce). 
 204. Karin, supra note 40, at 138. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 157 (“[L]abor standards terminate with (1) a dishonorable or bad conduct 
discharge; [or] (2) an other than honorable conditions (OTH) separation . . . .”). 
 207. 38 U.S.C. § 4304(2). 
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honorable service who is discharged during his last enlistment with an 
OTH discharge is denied protections under the Act.208 
The “veterans’ preference” offered by federal, state, and private sec-
tor employers is a valuable employment tool, but it is often reserved only 
for veterans discharged under honorable conditions.209 Veterans’ prefer-
ences attempt to remedy unemployment and reintegration problems ex-
perienced by many veterans.210 Historically, these preferences were offered 
by public sector employees. In the last decade, a number of states have 
expanded veterans’ preferences to include private sector employment, but 
again, these too bar veterans with OTH discharges.211 
Even when veterans are not explicitly excluded from employment pro-
grams because of their discharge characterization, they are often excluded 
because of discriminatory hiring practices. There are no per se Title VII pro-
tections for veterans if employers use a veteran’s discharge status to deny 
them employment.212 While the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) has taken the position that the use of criminal history 
questions in hiring may constitute unlawful race or national origin discrim-
ination under either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories, it is 
not clear that veterans have these same claims.213 It is also unknown whether 
employers may violate the Americans with Disability Act by using discharge 
status in hiring, given the disproportionate impact of discharges on veter-
ans with mental illness.214 
                                                                                                                                
 208. See Tootle v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 559 F. App’x 998, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding 
that the appellant’s three honorable discharges for previous periods of service did not pro-
vide standing for his USERRA claim after the appellant was discharged with a dishonorable 
discharge during his last period of service). 
 209. See Michael D. Sutton, Comment, Forging a New Breed: The Emergence of 
Veterans’ Preference Statutes Within the Private Sector, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1081, 1090 (2014) 
(explaining that some statutes regarding preference status include requirements regarding 
residency, honorable discharge, or disability status). 
 210. See Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 254 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding that pref-
erential treatment in veteran hiring does not violate equal protection principles when leg-
islatures provide a rational basis for the preference). 
 211. Ark. Code Ann. § 21-3-302(b)(1) (2013); Ga. Code Ann. § 43-1-13 (2014); Idaho 
Code § 65-502(17) (2014); Sutton, supra note 209, at 1090 n.59 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1) 
(2012)). 
 212. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018) (omitting 
protections for veterans); Karin, supra note 40, at 184 (“ [T]here is no per se violation of 
Title VII if an employer uses criminal history to make an employment decision . . . .”); Alyssa 
Peterson & Arjun Mody, How Employers Illegally Discriminate Against Veterans With Less-
Than-Honorable Discharges, Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (May 29, 2018), https://harvard 
crcl.org/how-employers-illegally-discriminate-against-veterans-with-less-than-honorable-
discharges [https://perma.cc/M895-A5W7] (“After receiving a less-than-honorable dis-
charge, veterans cannot access most state and federal veterans’ benefits. Moreover, a number 
of employers have gone so far as to adopt blanket bans on hiring veterans with bad paper.”). 
 213. See Karin, supra note 40, at 184 (“Of relevance to USERRA’s statutory OTH exclusion, 
the EEOC’s updated guidance confirms that not all use of criminal history is illegal . . . .”). 
 214. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b), 104 Stat. 
327, 329 (“It is the purpose of this Act— (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
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A few states have become acutely aware of the disparate impact of 
OTH discharges on people of color and disabled individuals and have 
taken steps to protect veterans from disclosing an unfavorable discharge 
status.215 In 2018, Connecticut became the first state to formally recognize 
that discrimination based on discharge status can violate protections based 
on race.216 The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities (CHRO) issued a fact sheet warning employers of blanket 
policies that may run afoul of antidiscrimination laws since data shows that 
adverse discharges are disproportionately issued to servicemembers of 
protected classes.217 Illinois and Wisconsin have also adopted statutory 
protections against employment discrimination of veterans with OTH 
discharges.218 
Despite the efforts of a few states, the disclosure of military discharge 
status for a variety of purposes remains commonplace in civilian society. 
Veterans must disclose their DD-214 to obtain employment, benefits, or to 
show proof of military service.219 The document’s conventional use is strik-
ing, given that DD-214s include other sensitive information in addition to 
                                                                                                                                
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to 
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”). 
 215. See Karin, supra note 40, at 185 (indicating that twenty-four states and over one-
hundred cities and counties have instituted ban-the-box laws). 
 216. Veterans Legal Services Clinic, IAVA-CT: Protecting Veterans With Bad Paper 
From Employment Discrimination, Yale L. Sch., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/ 
clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/iava-ct-protecting- 
veterans-employment-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/W6B7-SYRJ] (last visited July 27, 
2021). 
 217. See Conn. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities, Guide to Nondiscrimnation 
in Hiring and Employing Connecticut Veterans: Questions and Answers for Employers, 
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/chro/veteranemployerqaguidancepdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L6TZ-3W4F] [hereinafter Human Rights Report] (last visited July 27, 2021) (“Policies that 
discriminate against veterans who received a less-than-honorable discharge from the mili-
tary may also subject you to liability under current federal and state law, as a result of their 
disparate impact on veterans of color, LGBT veterans, and veterans with disabilities.”). The 
Commission also published a “know your rights” page, alerting veterans to the employer 
liability under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts. 
& Opportunities, Know Your Rights, https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/chro/knowyourrights 
veteranspdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2UK-3FCF] (last visited July 27, 2021); see also Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(b)(2019); Peterson & Mody, supra note 212 (describing Connecticut’s 
model for addressing the adverse impacts of biased policies discriminating based on 
discharge status). 
 218. See 68 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-102(A) (2016) (prohibiting discrimination based on 
“unfavorable discharge from military service in connection with employment”); Wis. Stat. 
§§ 111.32(3), 111.322, 111.335 (2016) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
military service, discharge characterization, or military criminal record). 
 219. Joe Wallace, DD214: Understanding Character of Discharge, MilitaryBenefits.info, 
https://militarybenefits.info/character-of-discharge/ [https://perma.cc/U559-WD46] (last 
visited July 27, 2021) (explaining the uses for the DD-214); see also Kevin Lonergan, Service 
Discharges; DD Form 214 Explained, U.S. Army (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.army.mil/ 
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discharge characterizations, such as social security numbers, birthdates, 
home addresses, and dates of service.220 It is not clear why military dis-
charge characterizations must be included on the DD-214, other than to 
make them available for employment and benefits purposes. The fact that 
the military has not addressed this issue is an indication of its blindness to 
the collateral consequences of its characterizations. 
f. Moral Injury. — The psychological impact of an OTH discharge, 
especially on those suffering from mental illness, is as equally overlooked 
as the psychological impact of incarceration on people involved with the 
criminal legal system.221 Researchers have used the term “moral injury” to 
describe experiences in which individuals “perpetrate, fail to prevent, or 
bear witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expecta-
tions.”222 This type of injury is exemplified by Vietnam War veterans, many 
of whom endured traumatic combat experiences and later returned to the 
United States to face scorn by the public and national media.223 Some 
Vietnam veterans and other servicemembers have reported experiencing 
moral injury in both combat and noncombat roles. For example, moral 
injury may be experienced when a servicemember is ordered to shoot the 
driver of a quickly approaching vehicle whose intentions are unknown, 
seeing wounded civilians and being unable to assist, being exposed to hu-
man remains, feeling a rush or enjoyment during war or killing, or making 
                                                                                                                                
article/73343/service_discharges_dd_form_214_explained/ [https://perma.cc/NZ33-JMS4] 
(noting that “most individuals and employers want to see an Honorable Discharge”). 
 220. Joe Wallace, How to Read DD Form 214, MilitaryBenefits.info, https://military 
benefits.info/how-to-read-dd214/ [https://perma.cc/488B-FVKZ] (last visited Aug. 18, 2021). 
 221. Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 257, 257 (2013) (“The experience of being locked in a cage has a psychological effect 
upon everyone made to endure it. No one leaves unscarred.”). 
 222. Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, 
Caroline Silva & Shira Maguen, Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A 
Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy, 29 Clinical Psych. Rev. 695, 697 (2009) 
(cleaned up); see also Shira Maguen & Brett T. Litz, Moral Injury in Veterans of War, 23 
PTSD Rsch. Q. 1, 1 (2012) (defining moral injury as “an act of serious transgression that 
leads to serious inner conflict because the experience is at odds with core ethical and moral 
beliefs”); Jonathan Shay, Moral Injury, 31 Psychoanalytic Psych. 182, 184 (2014) (describing 
a form of moral injury experienced by service members who act in violation of their own 
ideals, ethics, or attachments in war). 
 223. Approximately 2.7 million Americans served in the Vietnam War (1961–1975), 
and about 58,000 were killed. DOD discharged thousands of servicemembers for minor mis-
conduct who had experienced traumatic events and who were later diagnosed with mental 
health disorders. The Vietnam War is particularly associated with moral injury because of 
the social and political volatility of the conflict, and because of the well documented atroci-
ties that were committed against civilians as the U.S. struggled to adapt to guerilla warfare 
style of fighting. As a result of the bloody conflict and the moral ambiguity of the war, many 
Vietnam era veterans have experienced prolonged postwar symptoms of medical, psycho-
logical, and spiritual distress including moral injury. See Lindsey K. Slaughter, Psychologist, 
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., Richmond, Virginia VA Hospital, Community Hospices: Moral 
Injury in Vietnam Veterans, Presentation to Capital Caring Hospice (June 12, 2019) (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
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decisions that affect the survival of others.224 In extreme cases, it may in-
volve being ordered to break the rules of engagement, believing that com-
manders gave negligent orders or did not adequately support troops, or 
mistreating civilians or captured enemy combatants, as well as incidents 
involving death or harm to civilians, such as killing children, witnessing or 
perpetrating violence or sexual abuse on civilians, or disrespecting dead 
bodies.225 These actions may violate moral principles “that are rooted in 
religious or spiritual beliefs, or culture-based, organizational, and group-
based rules about fairness and the value of life.”226 
The symptoms of moral injury are often masked as behavior prob-
lems. Studies show that conflict between morally challenging situations 
and personally held beliefs or standards can cause servicemembers to ex-
perience negative self-attributions, guilt, shame, changes in ethical atti-
tudes and behavior, difficulty with forgiveness, and a reduced ability to trust 
others.227 Manifestations of moral injury include self-harm, “poor self-care, 
alcohol and drug abuse, severe recklessness, and parasuicidal behavior.”228 
In 2013, these new perspectives of trauma were recognized in an updated 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-
5), which is the official listing of psychological disorders used by healthcare 
professionals, including VA.229 The DSM-5 moved PTSD from the anxiety 
disorders section to the trauma and stressor-related disorders section of 
the manual.230 Feelings of guilt, shame, and self-deprecation were added 
                                                                                                                                
 224. Craig J. Bryan, AnnaBelle O. Bryan, Michael D. Anestis, Joyce C. Anestis, Bradley 
A. Green, Neysa Etienne, Chad E. Morrow & Bobbie Ray-Sannerud, Measuring Moral Injury: 
Psychometric Properties of the Moral Injury Events Scale in Two Military Samples, 23 
Assessment 557, 557–58 (2016) [hereinafter Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury]. 
 225. Victoria Williamson, Neil Greenberg & Dominic Murphy, Moral Injury in UK Armed 
Forces Veterans; A Qualitative Study, 10 European J. of Pyschotraumatology 1, 3–7 (2019). This 
study included qualitative interviewing of six veterans who reported moral injury and four cli-
nicians who had treated veterans with moral injury. The data from the interviews was analyzed 
using thematic analysis. The researchers found that after experiencing events which caused 
moral injury, veterans experienced consistent and significant psychological distress, including 
flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive thoughts, emotional numbness, suicidal ideation, negative 
appraisals of themselves and others, and exhibiting risky behaviors or self-neglect. 
 226. AnnaBelle O. Bryan, Chad E. Morrow, Neysa Etienne & Bobbie Ray-Sannerud, 
Moral Injury, Suicidal Ideation, and Suicide Attempts in a Military Sample, 20 Traumatology 
154, 154 (2014). 
 227. Id. at 154–55; see also Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 
557–70 (discussing the effects of violating moral standards on a servicemember’s emotional, 
mental, and social wellbeing). 
 228. Litz et al., supra note 222, at 701. 
 229. See The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 309.81 (5th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (noting DSM-5’s categorizing of PTSD as a trauma and stressor-
related disorder rather than an anxiety disorder); DSM-5 Measures, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans 
Affs., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/dsm-5_validated_measures.asp [https:/ 
/perma.cc/67G8-2K5H] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021). 
 230. See Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 557–58. In 1980, the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) added PTSD to its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-III). It was a landmark moment for servicemembers that marked 
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to the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under a new cluster referred to as “neg-
ative alterations in cognition and mood.”231 This classification was an im-
portant step in understanding the data showing marked increases in PTSD 
among servicemembers and veterans.232 
Despite VA’s recognition of this unique kind of trauma and its rela-
tionship to PTSD, the military continues to discharge servicemembers for 
misconduct rather than treat their mental illness.233 LTH discharges per-
petuate servicemembers’ feelings of guilt and shame, increase the chance 
of reexperiencing moral injury, and reduce the chance for self-forgiveness 
and recovery.234 Researchers have identified factors for measuring moral 
injury and have discovered associations between these factors and those 
used to measure self-injurious thoughts and behaviors.235 VA reported that, 
in 2017, about seventeen veterans committed suicide per day.236 More stud-
ies are needed to understand the association between moral injury and 
suicide, the second-leading cause of death for servicemembers, though 
moral injury is clearly a risk factor for suicide.237 
The military must be cognizant that discharge characterizations in-
volve more than administrative personnel matters and indeed affect the 
lives of those who have served long after they have departed the battlefield. 
VA must be particularly cognizant of the healthcare and housing needs of 
                                                                                                                                
the start of a major body of neuroscience and clinical research that continues to evolve and 
shape our understanding of trauma and warfighting today. The recategorizing of PTSD as a 
trauma and stressor-related disorder marked another important moment in the evolution 
of the medical community’s understanding of the disorder. See Anushka Pai, Alina M. Suris 
& Carol S. North, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the DSM-V: Controversy, Change, and 
Conceptual Considerations, Behav. Scis., Mar. 2017, at 7, 7 (noting “considerable research 
has demonstrated that PTSD entails multiple emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, anger) outside 
of the fear/anxiety spectrum, thus providing evidence inconsistent with the inclusion of 
PTSD with the anxiety disorders”). 
 231. Pai et al., supra note 230, at 4 (“The DSM-5 increased the number of symptom 
groups [for a PTSD diagnosis] from three to four and the number of symptoms from 17 to 
20.”). 
 232. Inst. of Med., Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Military and 
Veteran Populations: Final Assessment 41 (Nat’l Acads. Press ed., 2014) (noting that data 
from DOD and VA show marked increases in PTSD among servicemembers and veterans). 
 233. GAO Discharge Report, supra note 11 (noting that “91,764 servicemembers were 
separated for misconduct from fiscal year 2011 through 2015; of these servicemembers, 
57,141 - 62 percent - had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to their separation with 
PTSD, TBI, or other certain conditions that could be associated with misconduct”). 
 234. Litz et al., supra note 222, at 701 (finding that servicemembers with moral injury 
tend to suffer in isolation, creating a feedback loop in which they withdraw from others due 
to feelings of shame). 
 235. Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 155. 
 236. Off. of Mental Health & Suicide Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 2019 
National Veteran Suicide Prevention Annual Report 3 (2019), https://www.mentalhealth. 
va.gov/docs/data-sheets/2019/2019_national_veteran_suicide_prevention_annual_report 
_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9U5-H52Q]. 
 237. See Bryan et al., Measuring Moral Injury, supra note 224, at 154. 
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veterans during the current COVID-19 pandemic.238 Jeremy Travis, former 
chief of the National Institute of Justice, famously said of the thousands of 
Americans sent to prison that “they all come back.”239 Likewise, veterans 
with LTH discharges all come back seeking opportunities to reenter civil-
ian society. Rather than providing them with the tools they need to recover 
from the experiences of war, they are met with exclusionary policies that 
create barriers to their reentry and successful transition to civilian 
society.240 
2. The Failure of Discharge Review. — Discharge review boards are the 
primary means of obtaining relief from LTH discharges.241 However, as 
one board president recently noted, “the [Navy Discharge Review Board] 
is a review board, not a clemency board.”242 Review boards were never in-
tended to consider post-service conduct and evidence of rehabilitation, 
and the standards governing discharge review do not support the consid-
eration of such evidence.243 As a result, thousands of veterans with LTH 
discharges continue to be placed in a semicriminal status with no hope of 
reclaiming their honor or shedding their stigmatizing discharge 
characterizations.244 
a. The Legal Basis for Discharge Upgrade. — Veterans may petition their 
service branch to upgrade their discharges, though the process is notori-
ously slow and the majority of those who apply for upgrades are denied 
relief.245 Discharges may be changed or corrected through administrative 
                                                                                                                                
 238. Amy Palmer, How COVID-19 Shifted the Way We Support Veterans, Mil. Times 
(May 19, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/19/how-
covid-19-shifted-the-way-we-support-veterans/ [https://perma.cc/R29E-EY29] (explaining 
how COVID-19 cut off much of the volunteer support which helps to assist the functioning 
of VA hospitals, has prevented visitors to many of the patients within VA hospitals, and has 
increased the severity of the housing crisis already faced by homeless veterans). 
 239. See Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, U.S. 
Dep’t of Just., Sent’g & Corr.: Issues for the 21st Century, May 2000, at 1, 1 (“If current 
trends continue, this year more than half a million people will leave prison and return to 
neighborhoods across the country . . . .”). 
 240. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 40 (describing the difficult transition for vet-
erans with LTH discharges who are barred from receiving VA health care). 
 241. Character of Discharge Types, Senior Veterans Serv. All., https://www.veteransaid 
benefit.org/correcting_military_discharge.htm [https://perma.cc/CCU2-PD3C] (last vis-
ited Aug. 17, 2021). 
 242. Robert Powers, President, Navy Discharge Rev. Bd., Sec’y of the Navy, Council of 
Rev. Bds., NDRB Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at 11 (June 
7, 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (cleaned up). 
 243. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552–1553 (2018). 
 244. Veterans Legal Clinic, Underserved, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that administra-
tive discharges such as the “Other Than Honorable” designation place veterans in an eligi-
bility limbo which they cannot escape). 
 245. Veterans can wait anywhere between twelve to thirty months for a decision. Many 
veterans are not aware of their right to discharge review. VA Disability Claims and Appeals 
Process Timeline, Chisholm Chisholm & Kilpatrick Ltd (Apr. 30, 2019), https://cck-
law.com/blog/va-disability-claims-and-appeals-process-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/52KQ-
AKGM]. Those that do are overwhelmed by the process and rules for applying. The boards 
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boards whose decisions are reviewable in federal court.246 Each service 
branch has two boards that review discharge petitions.247 Discharge review 
boards (DRBs) have the authority to change the character of discharge or 
narrative reason for a discharge,248 except for discharges that were either 
issued pursuant to the sentence of a general court-martial or not issued 
within the DRB’s 15-year statute of limitations.249 Boards for the correction 
of military records (BCMRs) have the same powers as the DRBs but also 
have the authority to reinstate veterans to active duty, authorize retire-
ment, and issue backpay.250 Generally, petitioners must seek review at the 
DRB before appealing to the BCMR or federal courts.251 
Both review boards have similar standards of review. The DRB may 
take action on a servicemember’s discharge based on “equity,”252 while the 
BCMR may take action if there is an “injustice.”253 The standards of equity 
and injustice are generally the same and apply under three regulatory cir-
cumstances: (1) if the policy that led to the veteran’s discharge has now 
been changed to such a degree that the veteran would not have been dis-
charged as the policies currently stand; (2) if, at the time the veteran was 
discharged, the discharge was inconsistent with the standards of discipline 
                                                                                                                                
began a campaign in 2014, pursuant to a DOD mandate, to educate veterans on the dis-
charge review process. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts attach. 2 (Sept. 3, 2014) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) [hereinafter Hagel Memo] (directing the boards to create a comprehensive public 
messaging campaign); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 114-328, § 533, 130 Stat. 2000, 2121 (2016) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2018)) 
(requiring the boards to publish their decisions on the internet). 
 246. Conn. Veterans Legal Ctr., Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual 12 (2011), 
https://ctveteranslegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Connecticut-Veterans-Legal-Center-
Discharge-Upgrade-Manual-November-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/9343-64BN] [hereinafter 
Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual] (listing the standards of review for discharge review 
boards). 
 247. See id. at 10. The names of these boards differ among the services, though the 
laws and procedures are generally the same. See id. at 11. Section 523 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 added a “final” DOD-level review board for 
servicemembers who exhaust their administrative appeal rights at their respective service 
branch DRBs and BCMRs. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553a (2018); National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. 116-92, § 523, 133 Stat. 1198, 1354 (2019) (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1553a (2019)). The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the 
Secretary of the Air Force with oversight of the new board, officially titled the DOD 
Discharge Appeal Review Board (DARB), though the board hears appeals from every service 
branch. See Memorandum from David L. Norquist, Deputy Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
to Senior Pentagon Leadership, U.S. Dep’t of Def. 1 (Jan. 29, 2021) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 248. 32 C.F.R. § 70.8 (2020). 
 249. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a). 
 250. Id. § 1558; see also Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual, supra note 246, at 10. 
 251. See Veterans Discharge Upgrade Manual, supra note 246, at 10. 
 252. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b)–(c). 
 253. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1). 
2246 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:2203 
 
in military service of which the veteran was a member; and (3) if the dis-
charge was inequitable or unjust based on evidence relating to (A) quality 
of service or (B) capability to serve.254 Petitioners may also seek review 
based on clemency, but only if their discharge was issued pursuant to the 
order of a court-martial.255 
The DRB and BCMR may also take action on grounds of “error” and 
lack of “propriety.”256 Error and impropriety fall under two regulatory cir-
cumstances: (1) an error of fact, law, procedure, or discretion occurred, 
and the error was prejudicial to the veteran during the discharge pro-
cess;257 and (2) a change in policy by the military service of which the ap-
plicant was a member, made expressly retroactive to the type of discharge 
under consideration, requires a change in the discharge.258 Changes based 
on error or impropriety are rare and, when invoked, typically involve ret-
roactive policy changes.259 
In 2014, as a result of heavy lobbying efforts by Congress and Veterans 
Service Organizations (VSOs) as well as a federal lawsuit filed on behalf of 
Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were seeking relief from LTH dis-
charges,260 then- Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel issued a policy memo 
                                                                                                                                
 254. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c). The majority of discharge upgrade petitions are based on al-
legations of inconsistent standards or inequalities rather than on policy changes. For exam-
ple, after the repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy, the military invited gay and lesbian 
servicemembers to petition for discharge upgrades during a specified window of time, a rare 
occurrence. See Dave Philipps, Ousted as Gay, Aging Veterans Battling Again for Honorable 
Discharges, N.Y. Times (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/us/gay-
veterans-push-for-honorable-discharges-they-were-denied.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (detailing that many veterans were given LTH discharges, barring them from 
veterans’ benefits and government jobs and/or other employment, for being gay). 
 255. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(f)(2), 1553(a). Clemency generally refers to a change in a dis-
charge or dismissal adjudged by courts-martial. But see Memorandum from Robert L. 
Wilkie, Under Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (July 25, 2018), 
https://arba.army.pentagon.mil/documents/Wilke20180725JusticeEquityClemency.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FKB-3L8T] [hereinafter Wilkie Memo] (calling for the review boards to 
consider clemency in all cases, not only discharges or dismissals pursuant to courts-martial). 
 256. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1); 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b). 
 257. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b)(1)(i) (explaining that “prejudicial error” means that there is 
a “substantial doubt” that the discharge would have remained the same if the error had not 
been made). 
 258. Id. § 70.9(b)(1)(ii). 
 259. There are a number of reasons why the boards generally do not upgrade dis-
charges based on error. First, errors must be prejudicial, and boards do not often find prej-
udice. Second, the boards are generally boards of equity, and the members are not 
persuaded by technical errors. Finally, the formalization and inclusion of a Judge Advocate 
Corps in every service has reduced error rates. Cf. Alexander Holtzoff, Administration of 
Justice in the United States Army, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 1, 9 (1947) (noting how the dearth of 
military lawyers during World War II contributed to inequities in the military justice system). 
 260. Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14cv260(WWE), 2014 WL 7794807, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 
2014). In 2014, students at the Veterans Clinic at Yale Law School filed a class action lawsuit 
against the Navy on behalf of less-than-honorably discharged veterans suffering from PTSD 
and other mental illness. All five individual plaintiffs named in the case received discharge 
upgrades from the Board of Correction for Navy Records, and the class certification was 
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regarding discharge petitions raising mental health issues.261 The “Hagel 
Memo” stated that liberal consideration would be given to veterans peti-
tioning for discharge relief based on mental health reasons, including 
PTSD or related conditions.262 Subsequent memoranda provided guid-
ance for implementing liberal consideration and expanded its scope to 
include matters related to sexual assault and sexual harassment.263 
Notably, liberal consideration did not change the legal standards for 
an upgrade. Rather, it gave the boards the additional authority to liberally 
                                                                                                                                
dismissed. See Monk v. Mabus, Yale Law School Veterans Legal Services Clinic, https://law. 
yale.edu/studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services 
-clinic/monk-v-mabus [https://perma.cc/PG88-DXZA] (last visited July 27, 2021) (revealing 
that “[f]ive Vietnam combat veterans and three veterans’ organizations filed a class action 
lawsuit . . . seeking relief for tens of thousands of Vietnam Veterans” that received an other-
than-honorable discharge after developing PTSD during the war); see also Andrew 
Tilghman, DOD Willing to Reconsider Discharges of Vietnam Vets With PTSD, Mil. Times 
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/03/ 
dod-willing-to-reconsider-discharges-of-vietnam-vets-with-ptsd/ [https://perma.cc/BQ64-A 
JW6] (explaining that DOD had agreed to “reconsider the bad-paper discharges for thou-
sands of Vietnam-era veterans” after the federal lawsuit was filed). 
 261. See Hagel Memo, supra note 245, at 1. 
 262. Id. The Secretary of Defense regulates the military at the discretion of the 
President. See 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2018). The Secretary of Defense’s policy memoranda carry 
the weight of military orders or directives. See What Are the DOD Issuances?, Wash. 
Headquarters Servs., https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/general.html [https://perma 
.cc/WND2-JNDA] (last visited Aug. 26, 2021) (“Directive-type memoranda signed by the 
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense are policy-making documents. A directive-type 
memorandum shall be converted into a DoD Directive or DoD Instruction within 180 days, 
unless the subject is classified with limited distribution or is material of limited or temporary 
relevance.”). 
 263. Memorandum from A.M. Kurta, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, 
U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (Aug. 25, 2017), https://dod.defense.gov/ 
portals/1/documents/pubs/clarifying-guidance-to-military-discharge-review-boards.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V29A-E79C] [hereinafter Kurta Memo]; see also Memorandum from 
Brad Carson, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, U.S. Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys 
of the Mil. Dep’ts 1 (Feb. 24, 2016), http://veteransclinic.law.wfu.edu/files/2017/09/ 
Carson-Memo.pdf[https://perma.cc/VXB5-M7RD]. The Kurta Memo articulated four 
questions for petitioners seeking review: (1) Does the veteran have a condition or experi-
ence that may excuse or mitigate the discharge; (2) Does that condition exist or did the 
experience occur in service; (3) Does that condition or experience actually excuse or miti-
gate the discharge; and (4) Does the condition or experience outweigh the discharge. The 
most contested issue in the Kurta Memo is whether the condition or experience excuses or 
mitigates the discharge. The Kurta Memo provides favorable guidance to veterans on this 
question, stating that “[c]onditions or experiences that may reasonably have existed at the 
time of discharge will be liberally considered as excusing or mitigating the discharge.” Kurta 
Memo, supra, at attach. 2. The Kurta Memo questions provided much needed guidance to 
petitioners, most of whom are unrepresented. Tom Turcotte, Mil. L. Task Force of the Nat’l 
Law.’s Guild, Basics of Discharge Upgrading 4 (2020), https://dd214.us/reference/ 
DischargeUpgrade_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UU3-F2SR] (“Most of [the Military 
Discharge Review Board’s] caseload involves unrepresented applicants or those represented 
by traditional veterans’ organizations that often employ a very route [sic] approach . . . .”). 
The policy was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) for the DRBs and at 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h) for 
the BCMRs. 
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construe facts in such a way that recognized the myriad circumstances that 
may establish evidence of mental illness and its influence on servicemem-
bers’ behavior.264 For example, it allowed for relaxed evidentiary standards 
in cases involving mental illness, such as permitting veterans’ own state-
ments to establish illness and to provide a nexus between the illness and 
the unlawful behavior.265 Evidence of misconduct or changes in behavior, 
including requests for transfer, deterioration in work performance, sub-
stance abuse, episodes of depression, panic or anxiety attacks without an 
identifiable cause, and unexplained economic or social behavior changes, 
could be used to infer a mental health condition.266 It also allowed for the 
consideration that mental health conditions often remain undiagnosed 
until years after service and are frequently unreported in service.267 Over-
all, liberal consideration allowed the boards to exercise “greater leniency 
and excusal from normal evidentiary burdens” and instructed them not to 
expect the same burdens of proof for injustices committed at a time when 
the military had a limited understanding of mental illness and its behav-
ioral effects.268 
b. The Failure of Substantive Rules for Discharge Upgrade. — Despite 
DOD’s laudable policy, liberal consideration did not produce the results 
that veterans’ advocates had hoped to obtain. For example, for the first 
two quarters of 2019, almost five years after implementation of the Hagel 
Memo policies, the NDRB reported grant rates near preliberal considera-
tion levels, hovering around 23% for petitions involving PTSD, TBI, and 
other mental health conditions.269 The Army fared better, with grant rates 
around 60%.270 
                                                                                                                                
 264. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1388 n.199 (explaining “liberal consideration re-
quires the boards to consider the facts liberally and with an understanding of how facts may 
establish a mental health condition and a nexus between a mental health condition”). 
 265. See Kurta Memo, supra note 263, at attach. 2. The memo stated that evidence may 
come from sources other than a veteran’s service record, including a victim’s statement in 
a sexual assault case, “rape crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, physi-
cians, pregnancy tests, tests for sexually transmitted diseases, and statements from family 
members, friends, roommates, co-workers, fellow servicemembers, or clergy.” Id. at attach. 4. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at attach. 4. 
 268. Id. at attachs. 3–4. 
 269. See Boards Statistics CY2019, Boards of Review Reading Rooms, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Air Force, https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2019.htm (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (last updated Oct. 3, 2021) (reporting Navy board statistics for the first two quarters 
of 2019). See generally Wherry, supra note 22, at 1387 n.197 (discussing recent grant rates 
for the Navy Discharge Review Board). For the same period, the NDRB reported granting 
26.9% of petitions involving military sexual trauma, and 12.2% of petitions not involving 
mental health or military sexual trauma. 
 270. See Boards Statistics CY2019, supra note 269 (illustrating that the Army Discharge 
Review Board (ADRB) has granted 57.9% of the 126 mental health claims it has 
adjudicated). 
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The mixed results invited a pair of class action lawsuits against the 
Army and Navy alleging that the class of veterans, those with LTH dis-
charges suffering from mental health disorders, had been denied liberal 
consideration in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act.271 The lawsuits 
blamed the review boards for misapplying the evidentiary rules and for 
failing to follow special procedures for applicants with mental health prob-
lems as mandated in the DOD memos described above.272 In April 2021, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut approved a settle-
ment agreement between the Army and a class of veteran plaintiffs that 
allowed for the automatic reconsideration of thousands of veterans’ dis-
charge upgrade applications that were denied between 2011 and 2020.273 
In October 2021, the same court approved a similar settlement agreement 
in the Navy lawsuit.274  
c. Inadequate Standards for Discharge Review. — While the class action 
lawsuits addressed the improper application of standards, the standards 
themselves remain woefully inadequate. Neither equity nor propriety, the 
two bases for upgrade of an administrative discharge, provide a means for 
                                                                                                                                
 271. See Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110, 123 (D. Conn. 2018) (stating that Navy and 
Marine Corps veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to today and were (1) 
discharged with an LTH status, (2) failed to receive upgrades on their discharge status, and 
(3) have PTSD, properly form a class under Federal Rule 23 (b)(2)); Kennedy v. Esper, No. 
16CV2010 (WWE), 2018 WL 6727353, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018) (certifying a class of 
Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan era 
who were discharged with an LTH service characterization, had not received discharge up-
grades, and suffered from PTSD or PTSD-related conditions). 
 272. See Manker, 329 F.R.D. at 115 (granting class certification to a group of plaintiffs 
“challenging the NDRB’s characterization upgrade decision-making procedures, which are 
allegedly in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process protections”); Kennedy, 2018 WL 6727353, at *2–4 (denying defendant’s challenge 
to an injunction “ordering ADRB to take into consideration, follow, and apply the Hagel 
Memo and medically appropriate standards for PTSD into the applications for a change in 
discharge status”). 
 273. See Kennedy v. McCarthy, No. 3:16-cv-2010 (CSH), 2020 WL 7706604, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Dec. 28, 2021); Federal Court Approves Major Nationwide Settlement for Post-9/11 
Army Veterans, Yale L. Sch. (Apr. 29, 2021), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/federal-
court-approves-major-nationwide-settlement-post-911-army-veterans/ [https://perma.cc/M 
TZ3-NNG6] (explaining that the agreement’s conditions include permission for veterans 
who filed petitions between 2001–2011 to reapply; requirements that the Army articulate 
why an applicant does not qualify for an upgrade and that the ADRB inform applicants 
about legal representation; telephonic personal appearances; and training for ADRB mem-
bers); see also Press Release, Kennedy v. McCarthy, Yale L. Sch., https://law.yale.edu/ 
studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/ 
kennedy-v-mccarthy/ [https://perma.cc/2CUU-FQZX] (last visited July 28, 2021) (explaining 
that suit was filed, through Yale’s Veterans Legal Services Clinic, on behalf of about 50,000 
less-than-honorably discharged Iraq and Afghanistan era Army veterans with PTSD and 
other mental health related conditions). 
 274. See Manker v. Del Toro, No. 3:18-cv-00372 (CSH), slip op. at 2, (D. Conn. Oct. 12, 
2021). 
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considering evidence related to relief from collateral consequences. Pro-
priety applies only to errors of fact, law, and procedure, or changes in pol-
icy relevant to the period of service in question.275 Certainly, legal and 
procedural arguments can and should be made challenging LTH dis-
charges of servicemembers suffering from mental illness. Yet given the dis-
cretion and complexities involved in discharging servicemembers for 
misconduct rather than the underlying medical reasons, boards usually do 
not make findings of error based on legal or procedural grounds in these 
cases.276 
Equity provides a broader basis for discharge upgrade than propriety, 
though it provides no relief for collateral consequences. Under the equity 
standard, the boards may determine that relief is warranted based on the 
consideration of the petitioner’s service record “and other evidence pre-
sented to the DRB viewed in conjunction with the factors listed in [the] 
section.”277 The factors listed in the section include awards and decora-
tions, combat service, and other equitable factors directly related to the 
service period under review, but do not include any factors related to post-
service conduct or evidence of rehabilitation.278 The only reference to 
post-service evidence is in a provision allowing for the consideration of 
prior military service or outstanding post-service conduct that “provide[s] 
a basis for a more thorough understanding of the performance of the ap-
plicant during the period of service which is the subject of the discharge 
review.”279 The regulations simply do not contemplate changes in dis-
charge status based upon evidence of collateral consequences or the con-
sideration of post-service conduct or rehabilitation unrelated to the time 
service period under review. Discharge review focuses on a narrow period 
of time in the past and not on what veterans have accomplished or experi-
enced after service. 
d. Reluctance to Embrace Liberal Consideration. — Liberal consideration 
has provided the best opportunity for the review boards to look beyond 
the service period in question and to consider post-service evidence. Lib-
eral consideration invites the review boards to examine evidence obtained 
long after service to determine whether a servicemember’s misconduct 
was related to a mental health condition. Servicemembers may submit lay 
and expert testimony developed after service to support their claims that 
previously undiagnosed conditions contributed to their misconduct. To 
                                                                                                                                
 275. See 38 C.F.R. § 70.9(b) (2020). 
 276. See Powers, supra note 242, at 2–3 (highlighting the few findings of error or 
change in medically-related cases). 
 277. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c)(3) (2020). 
 278. Id. § 70.9(c) (listing equitable factors such as service history, rank, awards and 
decorations, letters of commendation, combat service, promotions, length of service, prior 
military service, convictions by civil authorities while a servicemember, family and personal 
problems, arbitrary or capricious action, and discrimination). 
 279. Id. § 70.9(j). 
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offset the difficulties of this endeavor, liberal consideration provides re-
laxed standards for the consideration of post-service evidence of mental 
illness and its relationship to service misconduct.280 Despite the flexibility 
provided by these standards, the boards have clung to their rigid preliberal 
consideration standards and have not consistently applied liberal consid-
eration in cases that warrant its application.281 
e. Conflict With Longstanding Discharge Review Policy. — There are sev-
eral reasons for boards’ reluctance to embrace liberal consideration. First, 
the policy is at odds with longstanding rules governing discharge review, 
such as the presumption that discharges were properly executed.282 Evi-
dentiary rules put the burden of proving errors or inequities on veter-
ans.283 The boards presume that discharges were properly executed unless 
a petitioner rebuts the presumption.284 Further, the boards apply a “pre-
sumption of regularity” in all discharge cases.285 That is, the boards pre-
sume regularity in the conduct of government affairs unless there is 
substantial and credible evidence to rebut the presumption.286 This evi-
dentiary presumption can be difficult for veterans to overcome, particu-
larly when the evidentiary record is incomplete. There is no formal 
discovery process for discharge review. Veterans must request records from 
their military service branch and VA. The records are often incomplete, 
especially for reservists and National Guard servicemembers.287 
For example, in a case before the Army BCMR, a veteran received an 
Article 15 for disrespecting two noncommissioned officers and destroying 
government property, all of which occurred on the same occasion.288 He 
was subsequently given an OTH discharge based on a “pattern of miscon-
duct,” a discharge typically reserved for servicemembers with a pattern of 
                                                                                                                                
 280. See Kurta Memo, supra note 263, at attachs. 1–4 (providing guidance to relevant 
authorities on how to handle applications for upgrading discharges related to mental health 
conditions). 
 281. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1386–95. 
 282. DODDI 1332.28, supra note 63, at enclosure 3, para. 2.12.6 (“There is a presump-
tion of regularity in the conduct of governmental affairs. This presumption shall be applied 
in any review unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”). 
 283. 32 C.F.R. § 581.3(e)(2) (2020); id. § 70.8 (b)(12)(vi). 
 284. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1392 (“[T]he Board . . . rejected the veteran’s re-
quest . . . [w]hile not explicit, the why and how was likely the presumption of government 
regularity and the Veteran’s failure to overcome the presumption.”). 
 285. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211; see also Peter Michael Gerdes, A Bit of History on the 
Presumption of Regularity, PrawfsBlawg (Jan. 14, 2019), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ 
prawfsblawg/2019/01/a-bit-of-history-on-the-presumption-of-regularity.html [https://perma. 
cc/MEQ7-DTT8] (highlighting that the presumption of regularity is an evidentiary pre-
sumption that people act appropriately, and the party claiming this presumption bears the 
burden to disprove). 
 286. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211. 
 287. Army Bd. for Corr. of Mil. Recs., ARAB No. AR20140016725 (May 21, 2015) (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 288. Id. 
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minor disciplinary infractions over a period of time.289 The veteran peti-
tioned the Army BCMR for a discharge upgrade because his military rec-
ord lacked sufficient evidence to support the basis for discharge.290 In its 
decision denying an upgrade, the Army BCMR conceded that the peti-
tioner’s record was void of the specific facts and circumstances concerning 
the events which led to his discharge from the Army.291 However, because 
the petitioner’s official discharge document, the DD-214, listed “pattern 
of misconduct” as the basis for discharge, the Army BCMR explained that 
they could presume that there were other instances of misconduct upon 
which the discharge was based even though they were absent from the 
record.292 
f. Deference to Commanders. — Second, boards routinely defer to the 
discharge decisions of commanders who have “boots on the ground” ex-
perience and are in the best position to make decisions affecting their ser-
vicemembers.293 Deference to commanders is a perennial doctrine in the 
profession of arms that strongly influences both military and civilian deci-
sionmakers.294 Its influence on the review boards is no exception.295 The 
boards view their role as a limited one, like appellate courts reviewing 
lower court decisions using an arbitrary and capricious standard. The 
boards will not second-guess commanders’ decisions unless there are clear 
                                                                                                                                
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See John F. O’Connor, The Origins and Application of the Military Deference 
Doctrine, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 161, 162 (2000) (stating that lower federal courts “sometimes mis-
state, misapply, or erroneously fail to apply the military deference doctrine”); Jeremy S. 
Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline?, 66 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 
129 (2017) [hereinafter Weber, Whatever Happened] (explaining that “[t]he military jus-
tice system places commanders in the central disciplinarian role” ). 
 294. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (stating that “courts must 
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the 
relative importance of a particular military interest”); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 
(1953) (“The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline 
from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous 
not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to inter-
vene in judicial matters.”); Kalyani Robbins, Framers’ Intent and Military Power: Has 
Supreme Court Deference to the Military Gone Too Far?, 78 Or. L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s “deference to the military” doctrine as the basis for nu-
merous rejections of challenges to military action). 
 295. See Michael Ettlinger & David F. Addlestone, Military Discharge Upgrading and 
Introduction to Veterans Administration Law 1S/1 (2d ed. 1990), https://ctveteranslegal. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MilitaryDischargeUpgrading_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/JDC9-FCK5] (“[A]gencies . . . are much more prone to assume that the veteran’s com-
mand’s actions were legally proper and that it exercised its discretionary powers correctly in 
characterizing the veteran’s discharge”); Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets Into Trouble”: 
Servicemembers, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1709, 1770 
(2017) (noting that military law reflects a substantial deference to decentralized command 
decisions that are rarely overturned by post-hoc administrative review). 
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inequities or improprieties.296 Because of this stalwart concept of military 
governance, the review boards are hesitant to broaden their concept of 
equity. 
The boards are especially reluctant to interfere with the services’ de-
cisions concerning the good order and discipline of their servicemem-
bers.297 Each service branch has its own disciplinary issues that may impact 
the assignment of discharge characterizations. For example, a service with 
drug or alcohol problems may want to increase punitive measures for sub-
stance use offenses. As such, it may issue OTH discharges or even conduct 
courts-martial for marijuana offenses, while another branch issues general 
discharges for the same offense.298 These disparities are sanctioned under 
the discharge review regulations. To prove inequity, a veteran must show 
that “the discharge was inconsistent with standards of discipline in the 
Military Service of which the applicant was a member.”299 Each service 
branch, as well as the individual components within each service branch, 
is within its authority to issue varying discharges depending on the needs 
and preferences of the individual unit. The boards are aware of these in-
dividual needs and are wary of interfering with the services’ disciplinary 
strategies. 
The composition of the boards also helps to explain their reluctance 
to interfere. DRBs are comprised of no fewer than three commissioned 
and noncommissioned officers.300 The BCMRs are comprised of senior ex-
ecutive civil servants from various components of DOD, including some 
who have previous military service.301 Few, if any, of the voting members 
                                                                                                                                
 296. See 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2020) (“There is a presumption of regularity in the con-
duct of governmental affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there is 
substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”). 
 297. See David A. Schlueter & Lisa M. Schenck, A White Paper on American Military 
Justice: Retaining the Commander’s Authority to Enforce Discipline and Justice 1 (2020), 
https://www.court-martial-ucmj.com/files/2020/07/White-Paper-on-Military-Justice-Reforms 
-2020-w-App.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3ES-AHJV] (stating that transferring prosecutorial 
discretion away from commanders will undermine their authority to maintain good order 
and discipline); Weber, Whatever Happened, supra note 293, at 161 (stating that command-
ers were thought to require a free hand to rule their commands with near-absolute 
authority). 
 298. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attach. 2 (“Similarly situated Service mem-
bers sometimes receive disparate punishments. A Service member in one location could 
face court-martial for an offense that routinely is handled administratively across the 
Service.”). 
 299. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
 300. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2018) (“The Secretary concerned shall . . . establish a 
board of review, consisting of not fewer than three members, to review the discharge or 
dismissal . . . of any former member of an armed force . . . or, if he is dead, his surviving 
spouse, next of kin, or legal representative.”); see also 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(b)(1) (“As desig-
nated by the Secretary concerned, the DRB and its panels, if any, shall consist of five mem-
bers.”). Commissioned and noncommissioned officers are selected by the service secretaries 
and generally have served at least five years in the military. 
 301. 10 U.S.C. § 1552; see also 32 C.F.R. §§ 581.3(c)(1), 723.2(a), 865.1. 
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are lawyers or judges. Given the narrow constraints of equity and impro-
priety and the deference traditionally afforded to discharging command-
ers, especially in matters related to the discipline of troops, boards are 
unlikely to substitute their own judgment for that of commanders. While 
the consideration of liberal standards, collateral consequences, and post-
service rehabilitation may all be relevant and essential to the successful 
reintegration of less-than-honorably discharged veterans, these considera-
tions often do not carry weight with board members and do not override 
the decisions of commanders. 
g. Merit-Based Discharge Review. — Finally, the boards are cognizant of 
the merit-based reasons for awarding discharge characterizations and will 
not interfere with the meritocracy of administrative discharges. Discharge 
characterizations are assigned based on standards of conduct and perfor-
mance in service.302 Honorable discharges are awarded to servicemembers 
who have performed adequately and are denied to those who have not.303 
The merit-based approach to discharges is evident in the decisions issued 
by the review boards. For example, in one representative decision, the 
NDRB stated: 
The NDRB recognizes that serving in the all-volunteer Armed 
Forces is challenging but reflects a commitment to our Nation; 
thus, servicemembers deserve to be recognized upon completion 
of their service. One of the ways in which our servicemembers are 
recognized is through the determination of their characteriza-
tion of service. Most servicemembers, however, serve honorably 
and therefore earn their Honorable discharges. In fairness to 
those Marines and Sailors who served honorably, Commanders 
and Separation Authorities are tasked to ensure that undeserving 
servicemembers receive no higher characterization than is 
due.304 
Liberal consideration disrupts the meritocracy because it considers 
factors other than merit in the awarding of honorable discharges. As the 
decision demonstrates, boards are weary of diluting the badge of honor by 
applying more liberal standards than those applied during the original 
separation. 
Discharge review, the sole mechanism available to veterans to escape 
the bounds of their discharge characterizations, is woefully inadequate to 
address the collateral consequences of LTH discharges. The boards were 
never intended to provide review beyond the scope of characterizing mili-
tary service. Liberal consideration provides some consideration of post-
service evidence but stops short of considering collateral consequences 
and rehabilitation evidence. Mechanisms are needed to address the needs 
                                                                                                                                
 302. DODDI 1332.14, supra note 32, at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(d). 
 303. Id. at enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a). 
 304. Naval Discharge Rev. Bd., No. ND12-01437 (June 12, 2018) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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of veterans with OTH discharges, much like the strategies that states have 
adopted to address the collateral consequences of arrests and convictions. 
III. REIMAGINING DISCHARGE REVIEW AS A REDEMPTIVE PROCESS 
In 2018, a memorandum from Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, Robert Wilkie, to service secretaries addressed the need for a 
more redemptive approach to discharge review.305 Secretary Wilkie ex-
plained that states were paying increasing attention to pardons for criminal 
convictions and “the circumstances under which citizens should be consid-
ered for second chances and the restoration of rights forfeited as a result of 
such convictions.”306 He called upon the DRBs and BCMRs to consider 
using their statutory authority to grant clemency relief to veterans whose 
applications were based on pardons for military criminal convictions.307 
Interestingly, the memo stated that in addition to granting clemency 
in criminal cases, the boards could grant clemency relief based upon “any 
other corrections, including changes in a discharge, which may be war-
ranted on equity or relief from injustice grounds.”308 It outlined guiding 
principles for clemency consideration and called upon the boards to pun-
ish only to the extent necessary, to rehabilitate to the greatest extent pos-
sible, and to favor second chances in situations in which individuals have 
paid for their misdeeds.309 The memo concluded with a list of factors to be 
considered in reviewing matters for clemency relief, including collateral 
consequences, length of time since misconduct, critical illness or old age, 
acceptance of responsibility, remorse, atonement for misconduct, and evi-
dence of rehabilitation.310 
The memo was remarkable for two reasons. First, it provided recogni-
tion that administrative discharges have collateral consequences that are 
detrimental to veterans, and that relief must be provided when warranted. 
Second, it urged the boards to consider clemency in non-courts-martial 
cases even though the statutory and regulatory authority to do so is unclear. 
This Part responds to the Wilkie Memo and to scholars who have 
called for more procedural fairness and deference to veterans in the dis-
charge review system, and for the expansion of VA benefits for veterans 
                                                                                                                                
 305. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at 1. Robert Wilkie served as Secretary of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs from 2018 to 2021 and served as the Under Secretary of 
Defense from 2016 to 2018. He served as an officer in the United States Navy and Air Force 
Reserves. 
 306. Id. (stating in the introduction that the Memo will close the gap and set clear 
standards for relief that should be granted through Military Discharge Review Boards). 
 307. See id. at attach. 1 (“Clemency refers to relief specifically granted from a criminal 
sentence and is a part of the broad authority that DRBs and BCM/NRs have to ensure fun-
damental fairness.”). 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. at attachs. 1–3. 
 310. Id. at attach. 3. 
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with LTH discharges.311 The below proposals offer a bold first step toward 
creating a system that provides procedural safeguards and ensures the ex-
pansion of military benefits for veterans regardless of their minor miscon-
duct in service. The first proposal calls for the codification and mandatory 
implementation of clemency consideration in all cases. The second pro-
posal urges VA to expand benefits for veterans with OTH discharges. Sub-
sequent proposals call for the adoption of reforms tested in the criminal 
law context. A thorough discussion of each proposal is beyond the scope 
of this Essay. Rather, the purpose of this Part is to briefly discuss the ap-
proaches and to demonstrate the need for a combined approach, similar 
to that taken by state jurisdictions to address the consequences of arrests 
and convictions.312 
A. Decoupling Benefits From Discharge Characterizations 
Benefits promised at enlistment should not be dependent on dis-
charge characterizations awarded through a system marred by inequi-
ties.313 The following proposals offer important first steps in separating the 
award of benefits from the faulty discharge characterization process. Clem-
ency allows for an upgrade resulting in benefits based on factors beyond 
the narrow sliver of a veteran’s military service record.314 Expanding bene-
fits to veterans with LTH discharges fully recognizes that Congress in-
tended for VA to provide benefits to all veterans except under the gravest 
circumstances.315 
An overhaul of the discharge system and the award of benefits to all 
veterans regardless of discharge characterization would be ideal. Congress 
                                                                                                                                
 311. See, e.g., Adams & Montalto, supra note 22, at 135 (arguing for the expansion of 
VA benefits for all but the most egregious cases); Rebecca F. Izzo, In Need of Correction: 
How the Army Board for Correction of Military Records Is Failing Veterans With PTSD, 123 
Yale L.J. 1587, 1601 (2014) (arguing for a presumption of causation for veterans with PTSD, 
acceptance of veteran’s testimony of combat events, and a presumption that later expert 
medical opinions rebut medical assessments at the time of discharge); Ledesma, supra note 
23, at 236 (arguing for a new “general-pending” discharge characterization that would pro-
vide a temporary discharge status so that veterans with PTSD could seek treatment); 
Wishnie, supra note 295, at 1770 (arguing that the current “military law conception” of 
board review gives too much deference to commanders and that the system should incor-
porate more substantive and procedural laws consistent with administrative law, veterans 
law, or civil service systems such as the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board). 
 312. See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11361.5 (2019) (California’s automatic ex-
pungement law). 
 313. See Wherry, supra note 22, at 1371 (“Many servicemembers were (and continue 
to be) kicked out of the military with an other-than-honorable discharge characterization 
for misconduct when that misconduct is actually a result of PTSD, traumatic brain injury 
(TBI), military sexual assault, or other mental health conditions.”). 
 314. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attachs. 1–3. 
 315. See House Hearings on G.I. Bill, supra note 174, at 415 (“We cannot use the words 
‘honorable discharge’ because . . . each of the services [differ] and would not include those 
discharges under honorable conditions. We do not like the words ‘under honorable condi-
tions’ because we are trying to give the veteran the benefit of the doubt . . . .”). 
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is not likely, however, to impose such reforms on the military or VA, nor is 
VA likely to adopt such a system in the near future.316 More importantly, 
decoupling benefits from discharges would not eliminate the stigma 
associated with LTH discharges or the resulting collateral consequences.317 
As such, the following proposals offer important and achievable steps to 
reform the discharge review process so that more veterans receive the ben-
efits they were promised at enlistment. 
B. Codification and Mandatory Clemency Consideration 
1. Codification of Clemency Authority. — The Wilkie Memo was a re-
sponse to review board members who believed that they were constrained 
by the narrow standards of propriety and equity and prohibited from 
granting upgrades based on any other grounds.318 The memo was ground-
breaking because, for the first time, DOD explicitly addressed the problem 
of collateral consequences and outlined a progressive and revolutionary 
approach that looked beyond a servicemember’s conduct in service.319 
Even so, the memo was only the first step toward addressing the problem 
of collateral consequences. In order to bring awareness to the issue and to 
increase the boards’ reliance on clemency as a basis for discharge, 
Congress must provide explicit statutory authority for clemency to serve as 
the basis for a discharge upgrade in non-courts-martial cases.320 Further, 
DOD must mandate the consideration of clemency relief in all cases. With-
out support from Congress and DOD, the clemency guidance will not 
likely change board outcomes or make a significant difference in the lives 
of veterans. 
Without clear statutory authority, clemency consideration for admin-
istrative discharges will likely fail. In the context of discharge review, clem-
ency refers to relief granted from a criminal sentence.321 Statutory 
authority for clemency is provided under 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552 and 1553. The 
statutes provide clear authority for the boards to correct records and to 
                                                                                                                                
 316. See Bedford, supra note 73, at 715–18 (“While Congress has taken small steps in 
granting some benefits to OTH discharged former [servicemembers], it is still unlikely 
Congress will change the definition of “veteran,” create a new eligibility requirement, or 
grant an exception to eligibility requirements for disability compensation.”). 
 317. See Brooker et al., supra note 21, at 17 (noting that more than 300,000 veterans 
were given stigmatizing characterizations). 
 318. Some board members believed that if the petition did not demonstrate error or 
inequity, other factors such as rehabilitation, pre- or post-service conduct, and letters from 
witnesses demonstrating the good character of the petitioner could not be considered as a 
basis for discharge upgrade. See Email from Robert Powers, President, Naval Discharge Rev. 
Bd., to Hugh McClean, Dir., Bob Parsons Veterans Advoc. Clinic, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of 
L. (May 15, 2020) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 319. See Wilkie Memo, supra note 255, at attach. 3 (noting that, in determining 
whether to grant relief on the basis of clemency, an applicant’s candor and character should 
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 320. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(f)(2), 1553 (a) (2018). 
 321. Id. 
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change discharges or dismissals adjudged by courts-martial for purposes of 
clemency.322 There is no explicit statutory authority for the boards to grant 
clemency in non-courts-martial cases.323 The Wilkie Memo instructed the 
boards to consider clemency pursuant to the boards’ authority to address 
equity and injustice.324 Prior to the memo, the clemency authority had not 
been interpreted so broadly and was strictly limited to cases involving 
courts-martial or UCMJ action.325 The boards do not publish statistics that 
identify the bases for granting discharge upgrades. But a review of cases 
decided by the Army Discharge Review Board in 2019 and 2020 yielded no 
results for discharge upgrades based on clemency in non-courts-martial 
cases, and only one upgrade of a court-ordered discharge.326 To overcome 
the boards’ historically narrow application of clemency and to address the 
lack of clear statutory authority, Congress will need to codify the policy if 
it is to have any effect on reducing collateral consequences of LTH 
discharges. 
2. Mandatory Clemency Consideration. — Even if Congress codified the 
policy, the boards’ application of clemency would likely be inconsistent 
and underutilized. In 2014, Secretary Hagel introduced the liberal consid-
eration policy to address the issue of less-than-honorably discharged 
Vietnam veterans with PTSD.327 In 2017, Congress codified the policy when 
it passed the National Defense Authorization Act.328 By 2019, the boards 
were still seeing inconsistent and low grants rates across the services, 
prompting two class action lawsuits against the Army and Navy for failing 
to properly apply DOD’s liberal consideration policy to thousands of vet-
erans suffering from mental illness.329 
                                                                                                                                
 322. Id. The DRB may only grant relief based on clemency if the discharge was the 
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Stronger implementation of recent DOD discharge review policies 
could increase their application and provide more consistency in board 
decisions. Scholars have proposed a number of reforms for ensuring the 
proper application of liberal consideration.330 For example, services could 
amend their regulatory definition of an honorable discharge to say, for 
example, “[h]onorable service includes behavior that may be categorized 
as misconduct under the UCMJ but is actually behavior consistent with a 
mental health condition due to military service.”331 Presumptions that 
override mental health considerations could be amended so that they are 
consistent with liberal consideration.332 For example, the presumption of 
an equitable discharge and the presumption of regularity could be limited 
in cases involving mental illness.333 Or, as some veterans’ advocates have 
suggested, Congress could even codify a presumption of record correction 
for veterans with documented PTSD.334 
Similar changes could be made to strengthen the implementation of 
the clemency policy. For example, clemency consideration could be man-
dated in all cases, instead of leaving its application to the discretion of the 
boards. This would require the boards to consider the Wilkie Memo clem-
ency factors in every case. A bifurcated approach to discharge review could 
allow for a finding that the original discharge was properly executed and 
otherwise equitable, but that clemency considerations warrant an 
upgrade. 
In addition to stronger enforcement of the policies, true clemency 
consideration would require structural change. The current boards are 
not equipped to carry out the clemency mission and, given their history, it 
is difficult to imagine them pursuing a robust implementation of the pol-
icy.335 The boards’ narrow and inflexible approach to discharge review 
stands in stark contrast to the forward-looking and redemptive approach 
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that clemency provides.336 A restructuring of the boards could provide for 
both traditional discharge review and clemency consideration. The cur-
rent two-tiered structure of DRBs and BCMRs has been criticized as redun-
dant and unnecessary.337 A single board could perform the functions of 
the DRB and BCMR, while another board could provide clemency review. 
Since discharge review laws already allow for the consideration of clem-
ency in court-martial cases, a specialized board could review clemency pe-
titions stemming from both court-martial and administrative discharges 
and would consider factors such as collateral consequences and rehabili-
tation.338 This approach makes sense given the military’s increasing reli-
ance on administrative justice and the prevalence of discharges with 
complex mental health issues. 
Any proposals for broader clemency power would likely face opposi-
tion. First, clemency could work against veterans. Commanders may be 
more likely to impose OTH discharges knowing that they can be upgraded 
by a clemency board. Second, clemency could be leveraged in plea nego-
tiations to coerce servicemembers to consent to OTH discharges in lieu of 
courts-martial based on the likelihood of an upgrade.339 Third, opponents 
may view clemency as infringing on commanders’ discretion and usurping 
their powers to maintain good order and discipline. Finally, clemency has 
garnered considerable negative attention in the last decade, including a 
string of headline-grabbing scandals involving the military that drew the 
ire of Congress and DOD. In one case, a Navy SEAL, who allegedly stabbed 
a prisoner and was convicted of war crimes, received a pardon from then-
President Trump.340 Over the objection of Navy leadership, President 
Trump also intervened in the servicemember’s pending discharge.341 In 
another case, an Air Force pilot convicted of rape was granted clemency 
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by the convening authority following the sentencing in his case.342 The 
convening authority overturned the verdict, released the pilot from 
prison, and reinstated his rank.343 
While both the military and civilian criminal legal systems have faced 
criticism over their use of clemency, it is not likely that administrative dis-
charge cases would draw the same criticism.344 Boards issue panel decisions 
and operate as independent military agencies, thus reducing the chance 
of politically motivated clemency action. Further, board decisions are not 
as highly charged as criminal prosecutions, and decisions are generally is-
sued long after the incidents of alleged misconduct. Lastly, any negative 
incentives created by clemency would be offset by positive incentives. For 
example, the opportunity for clemency based on evidence of rehabilita-
tion, employment history, or collateral consequences would incentivize 
veterans to seek opportunities for rehabilitation after service. 
C. The Expansion of VA Benefits 
A second proposal addressing collateral consequences involves ex-
panding VA coverage to include veterans with OTH discharges.345 The ma-
jority of reentry benefits denied to veterans are offered through VA. 
Expanding VA eligibility for less-than-honorably discharged veterans 
would be a significant step toward removing barriers to veteran 
reintegration. 
There is precedent for expanding benefits for certain categories of 
veterans, and VSOs have overwhelmingly supported such efforts in the 
past.346 The basis for the current administrative discharge characteriza-
tions of honorable, general, and other-than-honorable evolved from an 
earlier dichotomic discharge system that awarded either honorable or 
“without honor” discharges to veterans.347 The limited choices under that 
system created a dilemma for military commanders whose troops had en-
gaged in misconduct but had generally demonstrated satisfactory military 
                                                                                                                                
 342. Robert Draper, The Military’s Rough Justice on Sexual Assault, N.Y. Times (Nov. 
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on-sexual-assault.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Craig Whitlock, Air 
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performance.348 Leveraging extensive congressional interest in the mili-
tary justice system after World War II, VA successfully advocated for DOD 
to create definitive benefit-eligible discharge categories that later formed 
the basis for the current discharge system.349 VSOs have always supported 
the expansion of veterans benefits, as these organizations fulfill their stat-
utory duties primarily by assisting veterans with benefits claims and 
appeals.350 
Importantly, no congressional action would be needed to expand ben-
efits and services for veterans. Pursuant to congressional delegation, VA 
administers its own regulatory bars for veterans.351 Scholars have argued 
that limiting exclusions to serious offenses, such as those enumerated in 
the statute, is consistent with the legislative history and congressional in-
tent of the G.I. Bill of Rights.352 It is also consistent with the military’s cen-
tury-old interpretation of “dishonorable conduct,” defined as conduct 
involving severe military offenses and civilian felonies.353 Further, an ex-
pansion of benefits would bring VA in line with current trends in military 
justice that show a decrease in the grant of honorable discharges and a 
corresponding increase in the grant of OTH discharges.354 
Alternatively, VA could apply liberal consideration in character of dis-
charge determinations. Currently, VA allows veterans with OTH discharges 
to request a character of discharge review to determine their eligibility for 
benefits under the statutory and regulatory bars.355 If VA determines that 
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 353. Id. at 96. 
 354. Id. at 97. 
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Discharge: General Information (2014), https://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/docs/ 
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the conditions that led to a veteran’s OTH discharge were not dishonora-
ble (i.e., not barred by statute or regulation), then the veteran is deemed 
“eligible for VA purposes,” despite their OTH discharge.356 For example, 
if a veteran received an OTH discharge for using marijuana, VA could con-
ceivably find that their conduct was not barred by statute or regulation. In 
practice, few veterans are deemed eligible to receive benefits upon dis-
charge review.357 Most are found ineligible because the conditions under-
lying their discharge are determined to involve moral turpitude or willful 
and persistent misconduct under the regulatory bars.358 VA could apply 
liberal consideration in cases alleging mental illnesses, as the military has 
done, rather than having veterans wait years to receive discharge upgrades 
from the military. Applying liberal consideration to VA’s character of dis-
charge review, or even granting benefits for a preliminary period while 
veterans’ cases work their way through either military or VA review, would 
expand care for veterans who are most in need of VA’s services. 
Similarly, VA could apply liberal consideration in service-connected 
cases. Veterans with OTH discharges are eligible to receive healthcare ben-
efits but not other VA benefits when VA determines that they suffer from 
service-connected illnesses or injuries and they are not otherwise statuto-
rily barred from receiving benefits.359 Veterans may establish service con-
nection in a variety of ways, but it is generally proven by demonstrating 
that a current injury or illness was incurred or aggravated during military 
service.360 VA could lower the evidentiary bar to obtain healthcare benefits 
for applicants who suffer from mental health conditions and have OTH 
discharges. 
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Finally, VA could provide mental health care for all veterans, regard-
less of discharge, and forgo the framework of emergency exceptions and 
limited categories imposed by statutes and regulations. First, such a policy 
is prudent because it addresses a current crisis. Second, VA is the largest 
healthcare system in the country and has some of the most sophisticated 
technology and expertise to treat military-related mental health issues.361 
VA has the resources and expertise to extend mental health services to 
more veterans.362 Third, providing veterans with comprehensive mental 
health treatment is in the interest of national security. The United States 
has not relied on a draft since the Vietnam War.363 Men and women, the 
majority of whom are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four, vol-
unteer to sacrifice their lives in service to the nation. If this trend is to 
continue, the nation must improve care for more veterans. Lastly, provid-
ing health care to veterans is the right thing to do. Withholding expert VA 
mental health care from any veteran violates the sacred military ethos: 
“Never leave a fallen comrade.”364 
D. Applying Criminal Law Reforms to the Military 
In addition to the technical approaches discussed above, several 
mechanisms employed in the criminal law context to remove collateral 
consequences stemming from involvement in the criminal legal system 
could be applied to the military discharge system. This section briefly out-
lines the application of those mechanisms. 
1. Certificates of Restoration of Rights for Veterans. — Several jurisdictions 
have experimented with certificates restoring rights or establishing the re-
habilitation of persons involved in the criminal legal system.365 The mili-
tary discharge review system was intended to achieve similar goals by 
upgrading veterans’ discharges and restoring benefits eligibility. Yet the 
boards have been reluctant to accept mitigating factors, including mental 
health, in cases involving misconduct.366 
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The creation of clemency boards would resolve this problem by de-
coupling benefits from discharge characterizations. For example, if a vet-
eran’s military service involved serious misconduct but their post-service 
conduct demonstrated successful rehabilitation, a clemency board could 
issue a certificate of rehabilitation restoring the veteran’s VA benefits.367 
Such authority would require federal legislation, but it would give the 
boards an option to restore benefits for rehabilitated veterans by sidestep-
ping the often contentious characterization issue. The stigma of an LTH 
discharge would remain, but at least the veteran would obtain benefits for 
their service. 
2. Presidential Pardons. — Presidential pardons are wrought with pol-
itics, bureaucracy, and cronyism, though there is precedent for their use 
in resolving thorny military discharge issues.368 In 1974, President Gerald 
Ford signed Proclamation 4313 authorizing an incentive program for 
Vietnam War veterans who had evaded the draft or deserted their military 
duties to upgrade their discharges.369 Upon completion of twenty-four 
months of alternative service promoting the health, safety, or interests of 
the United States (not including military service), veterans could receive 
a “clemency discharge” in lieu of their undesirable discharge.370 In 1977, 
President Jimmy Carter granted pardons to all veterans who could be al-
leged to have committed an offense in violation of the Military Selective 
Service Act by evading the draft.371 These pardons did not restore benefits 
or grant full absolution to veterans, though they arguably helped unite a 
divided nation reeling from the Vietnam War.372 
Any sitting president could issue clemency discharges granting bene-
fits to veterans with mental health problems that received LTH discharges. 
Eligibility could be tailored to a specific time period, as it was for Vietnam 
War veterans, or tailored to cover veterans of any conflict who experienced 
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mental health problems in service. Clemency boards could oversee the 
process, including the review of more complex cases. Unlike the clemency 
discharges issued by Presidents Ford and Carter for Vietnam War veterans, 
benefits could be restored under a presumption that medical reasons were 
a contributing cause of the veteran’s discharge. 
3.  Ban-The-Box for Veterans. — There is no clear reason why veterans 
must disclose their discharge status to civilian employers, at least not ini-
tially. Reference checks are a common practice in hiring, but few job can-
didates are vetted at the outset of the process using previous employers’ 
performance evaluations.373 Like ban-the-box protections, questions about 
veterans’ discharges should be eliminated from job applications, and a re-
fusal to hire based on an applicant’s discharge characterization should 
only be permitted if the circumstances underlying the discharge are di-
rectly related to the occupation for which employment is sought.374 
No single approach to addressing collateral consequences is compre-
hensive, and there is no shortage of policies that could address the prob-
lem. Ban-the-box regulations and statutes could be adopted to eliminate 
questions about discharge status, the military could remove discharge 
characterizations from the DD-214, and the discharge process could be 
amended to create less stigmatizing outcomes for servicemembers with 
mental illness. Unlike the contentious issues that divide criminal law re-
form along political lines, policies facilitating veteran reintegration are bi-
partisan.375 Yet the stigma and bias surrounding less-than-honorably 
discharged veterans remain a barrier to much needed reform. The codifi-
cation of clemency and its mandatory application in discharge review, 
along with a realignment of VA exclusions that more closely track with 
congressional intent, offer two technical approaches to address the prob-
lems inherent in military discharge review. These proposals offer bold ap-
proaches that will begin to address the mental health crisis facing our 
veterans. 
CONCLUSION 
The military discharge review system is broken. Veterans with mental 
health conditions are discharged at alarming rates and labeled with LTH 
discharges that have lasting and debilitating consequences. The situation 
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is not unlike the problem affecting a growing number of Americans suf-
fering from the collateral consequences of criminal arrests and convic-
tions. The criminal legal system disproportionately affects people of color, 
predominantly Black and brown people, whose criminal records are sub-
sequently used to formally and informally exclude them in the contexts of 
employment, licenses, permits, housing, public benefits, and civil rights. 
As a result, a significant and vital segment of our population is continually 
funneled into additional criminality and imprisonment with no hope of 
reintegration. 
States have begun to address the problem through various statutory 
and judicial reforms. “Forgiveness” models favor court-issued certificates 
of rehabilitation that absolve individuals of past wrongs and serve as a to-
ken of full remediation, while executive pardons offer relief to individuals 
by removing legal disabilities and penalties associated with convictions. 
Concealment models offer expungement and record-sealing to remove 
criminal histories from public view. Some states have adopted licensing 
and employment laws that exclude the consideration of criminal records 
that do not directly relate to the duties of the profession. These reforms 
are promising and will serve as models for more states to address the 
problem. 
Less well known or understood are the collateral consequences of 
LTH discharges. Less-than-honorably discharged veterans are excluded 
from dozens of life-saving VA programs, such as healthcare and housing 
programs, that are aimed at assisting veterans facing reintegration chal-
lenges. In addition to VA exclusions, these veterans are excluded from fed-
eral employment protections and from state employment, education, and 
licensing programs. Moral injury, the psychological strain that veterans 
may experience as a result of their discharge, is the least understood but 
arguably the most troubling of these consequences. VA’s recognition of 
this trauma, especially in Vietnam Era veterans, is an essential first step in 
understanding its harmful impact and eliminating it as a barrier to reentry. 
Shockingly, there are no effective remedies to address the collateral 
consequences of LTH discharges. Discharge review, which offers relief for 
a limited number of veterans whose petitions are granted based on equity 
and impropriety grounds, does not consider the collateral consequences 
of discharges. Liberal consideration provides the review boards with lim-
ited discretion to upgrade discharges based on evidence of mental illness 
obtained after service. Otherwise, the boards do not consider clemency, 
collateral consequences, or evidence of rehabilitation that is not directly 
linked to the period of service under review. As a result, most veterans 
carry a lifetime label of dishonorable service that can never be forgiven or 
forgotten. 
Soldiers, sailors, and airmen, often experiencing social and economic 
hardship, enlist in the military in part based on the promise of benefits 
that will assist with their successful reintegration after service. When they 
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are injured and exhibit symptoms in the form of misconduct, they are dis-
charged with LTH service characterizations and succumb to the burdens 
of the collateral consequences resulting from those discharges. The mili-
tary, VA, and Congress must stop ignoring the burden our veterans carry 
long after service and instead start providing veterans with a chance to 
succeed by addressing these collateral consequences. 
